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ABSTRACT
This thesis explores subjective understandings of mobile technology surveillance, as it
seeks to answer an overarching research question: how is surveillance from mobile
technologies understood by those who are surveilled? Using Ewick and Silbey’s (1998)
socio-legal conception of legal consciousness, this thesis constructs a similar concept
within surveillance studies called surveillance consciousness. Surveillance consciousness
of drones and Stingrays is explored through comments below the line (see Graham &
Wright, 2015) and social media discourse in the post-Snowden era. The findings of this
thesis expound on the complexities of subjective understandings of mobile technology
surveillance. Such complexities contribute to surveillance studies by addressing whether
current theoretical models can be sufficiently used to analyze the current surveillance
society. Finally, this thesis shows how two sub-disciplines, surveillance and socio-legal
studies, benefit from greater dialogue and cross-fertilization.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the 21st Century, mobile technologies have grown in prevalence and allowed people
worldwide to further immerse themselves into the digital world (Harcourt, 2015; Goggin,
2012). Every day, people use “app-centric media” (see Daubs & Manzerolle, 2016),
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, hereinafter drones), laptops and health-monitoring
technologies to conveniently accomplish certain tasks or enjoy activities. In using such
technologies, people and their activities are often continuously monitored for various
purposes such as determining illegal activities or advertising (see Ball, 2017). Surveillance,
according to Lyon (2007: 14, as cited in Čas et al., 2017: 1), is “the focused, systematic
and routine attention to personal details for purposes of influence, management, protection
or direction.” Unlike many traditional, stationary, and temporally-limited surveillance tools
(see Weller, 2012), mobile technologies facilitate an easier route to retrieve information
that governmental agencies and corporations seek. These technologies have been part of
surveillance’s substantial proliferation and have allowed surveillance to affect many facets
of everyday life (Bauman et al., 2014) from workplaces (see Lee & Kleiner, 2003; Ball,
2010) to educational settings (see Hope, 2009) and more.
As contemporary mobile surveillance technologies have proliferated they have
allowed governments 1, commercial agencies, and ordinary citizens to retrieve information
from and about various populations, in many cases across jurisdictional boundaries (see
Van Hoboken & Rubinstein, 2014). The methods and reach of this surveillance, however,
have significantly extended beyond our imaginations and even Orwell’s dystopia described
in his influential book Nineteen Eighty-Four (hereinafter, 1984) about surveillance of the
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The data retrieved for this thesis emphasizes state surveillance.
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citizenry by the state or Big Brother. Populations being surveilled by the state (cf. Harney,
2013: 542-44 on Italian State surveillance) – through entities like the National Security
Agency (NSA) and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) – are also being
surveilled by corporations like Google and Apple (Bauman et al., 2014), as “data [has
become] a new currency” (Young, 2012: 163). As suggested by Pringle (2017), data is now
more valuable of a source for income than even oil (see also Srnicek, 2016).
Starting on June 6, 2013, with the help of journalists former NSA contractor
Edward Snowden leaked various NSA and other security agencies’ files consisting of mass
surveillance programs (Greenwald, 2014; Deukmedjian, 2014; Verble, 2014; Lyon, 2015a,
2015b; Epstein, 2017). These files contained program information about how the NSA,
CSIS and other agencies like the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)
were surveilling citizens of many nations using various technologies, as well as what was
being done with the acquired data. For instance, Ball (2014) of The Guardian reports that
the NSA collects millions of text messages across the globe using a program named
Dishfire collecting “pretty much everything it can.” An example of a program used by
CSIS capable of operating through mobile technologies is the Operational Data Analysis
Centre (ODAC) program which
is a powerful program which processes metadata resulting in a product imbued with
a degree of insight otherwise impossible to glean from simply looking at granular
numbers. […] [T]he end product is intelligence which reveals specific, intimate
details on the life and environment of the persons the CSIS investigates. The
program is capable of drawing links between various sources and enormous
amounts of data (Re X, 2016 FC 1105: 23).
The Snowden revelations led to increased awareness of the extent to which and how people
are being monitored through such programs (Lyon, 2015a). An appreciation of how people
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understand, experience, reflect upon, and respond to this surveillance is lacking in
surveillance studies and related scholarship, particularly in North America.
This thesis is guided by an overarching research question: how is surveillance (or
dataveillance, see van Dijck, 2014) from mobile technologies understood by those who are
surveilled? Addressing this question requires comprehending how people understand,
experience, reflect upon, and respond to mobile technology surveillance. As a starting
point, this thesis adopts Ewick and Silbey’s (1998) influential conception of ‘legal
consciousness’ (described below) from socio-legal studies and constructs a companion
concept in surveillance studies. Taking a similar approach to Ewick and Silbey’s, except
focusing on surveillance rather than law, this thesis considers whether and how people are
situated with, before and against (following Ewick and Silbey’s heuristic) surveillance to
investigate what I call ‘surveillance consciousness’, or how people understand, experience,
reflect upon, and respond to mobile technology surveillance (cf. Gilliom, 2006). As such,
this thesis seeks to address the following sub-questions: (1) How and to what extent do
Ewick and Silbey’s three narratives encapsulate subjective understandings of mobile
technology surveillance? (2) Does surveillance consciousness regarding mobile
technologies vary according to the type of media through which it is articulated? (3) Does
surveillance consciousness regarding mobile technologies vary by type of mobile
technology surveillance? And (4) how do people respond to the privacy and/or legal
implications of mobile technology surveillance? This thesis provides an account of
surveillance consciousness regarding mobile technologies – particularly drones and
Stingrays – that lends insight into North American understandings, experiences, reflections
upon, and responses to surveillance with the intent to fill in research gaps about “the human
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dimensions of surveillance” (Wood, 2005: 474). Studying people’s accounts of mobile
technology surveillance better equips us to discern whether concepts, theories and
perspectives should be created and/or modified to fit how we understand contemporary
surveillance.
This thesis unfolds in five chapters following this one. This chapter contains a set
of key technological definitions underpinning this thesis and descriptions that allow the
reader to visualize the two types of devices predominantly emphasized hereinafter. The
second chapter proceeds to outline previous research in many areas of surveillance studies
(see Lyon, 2002) pertinent to the current study. Chapter Three then outlines the theoretical
framework serving as the crux of this thesis. Here, the notion of legal consciousness is
explicated. Chapter Four then describes the methods and procedures used to collect and
analyze the data used for the current study. The fifth chapter discusses the findings of this
thesis, particularly the common themes and (in)consistencies with Ewick and Silbey’s
narratives of legal consciousness. The sixth and final chapter discusses implications for
theoretical models of surveillance, limitations of this thesis, scope of surveillance
consciousness, and possibilities for future research. In the following chapters, this thesis
aims to contribute to attempts by scholars to further understand surveillance in North
America by exploring surveillance consciousness; this is established by examining the
subject’s point of view concerning mobile technology surveillance and critically engaging
with the common conceptual models of surveillance.
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1. Key Technological Definitions
Mobile technologies have been defined as “handheld [information technology] artifacts
that encompass hardware (devices) […] and communication (network services)”
(Jarvenpaa & Lang, 2005: 8). For this thesis, surveillance consciousness toward drones and
Stingrays was explored. These two types of technological devices have grown significantly
in the 21st century and have been used for various purposes discussed below.
According to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), a drone is a “powerdriven aircraft that is operated without a flight crew member on board” that contains
“associated elements, such as a camera,” signifying what is called the “system” of the drone
(RCMP Operational Manual, 25.7. Unmanned Aerial System, s. 1.1.1-2.).2 Numerous
models exist, including the Draganflyer X6 and the Aeryon Scout containing high-end
cameras that contain infrared and high-definition features (RCMP Operational Manual,
25.7.). Beyond security and operational uses by law enforcement, drones have also become
available for public consumption and are used for commercial purposes (see Lidynia,
Philipsen, & Ziefle, 2017). Ultimately, many drones are used for the sole purpose of
monitoring individuals or the public. In Canada, drones are regulated under the Aeronautics
Act (1985, c. A-2) while the Federal Aviation Administration as part of the Department of
Transportation ensures regulation in the US.
The second technology referred to in this thesis has been categorized as ‘mobile’
for the purposes of this research. Though by definition mobile technologies denote devices
having a mobile or handheld feature like a smartphone, the International Mobile Subscriber
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This definition was extracted from files retrieved from the RCMP through Freedom of
Information requests.
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Identity (IMSI) catcher, now commonly known as the “Stingray,” is stationary (Dingman,
2016). Physically appearing to be a box with a hub with several ports, the Stingray has the
capability of imitating a “base station or tower like the ones Rogers and Bell operate”
(hence Stingrays also being labeled as cell-site simulators) and indiscriminately gathering
data from mobile devices connected to the network in each area (2016). In other words,
Stingrays remain in one spot and are used to gather information from different types of
technology in a geographic area. For the remainder of this thesis, the term ‘mobile
technology surveillance’ will be used to refer to drones and Stingrays that are used to
conduct both mass and targeted surveillance.
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Despite an increasing focus on surveillance due to what many now call the emergence of
the surveillance society (Lyon, 2007), literature on surveillance has neglected, to a
considerable extent, people’s personal understandings and experiences of surveillance
practices (hereinafter, subjects). As billions of subjects are constantly surveilled in their
daily lives – by cellular devices, video cameras, drones, the NSA and other national
security or intelligence agencies, and other governmental bodies and commercial agencies’
programs such as ‘XKeyScore’ (Lyon, 2014; Greenwald, 2013) – surveillance scholarship
has tended to be limited to analyzing the extent to which these subjects are surveilled, by
what means, and how frameworks can be used to understand such practices (see Bloss,
2002; Magnet, 2011).

1. Conceptual Models of Surveillance
This section will first address two commonly used conceptual models of contemporary
surveillance – namely Foucault’s panopticon and Haggerty and Ericson’s surveillant
assemblage – and their pertinence to the study of surveillance consciousness. Then it
proceeds to engage with existing research on the understandings and experiences of
surveillance. This thesis critically examines these existing models by focusing on subjects’
accounts of surveillance and how these are situated in correspondence to the models. This
emphasis lends insight into whether current surveillance models and perspectives require
modification (Zureik, 2007). It is important to note and reiterate that most research in
surveillance studies has neglected subjective understandings of surveillance.
Several scholars have analyzed and worked through Foucault’s (1995) analysis of
Bentham’s ‘panopticon’ (see, for example, Lyon, 1993; Gill, 1995; Green, 1999; Haggerty
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& Ericson, 2000; Koskela, 2003; Simon, 2005; Haggerty, 2006; Bauman & Lyon, 2013).
The intention of this circular model prison was to instill a sense of self-awareness in its
segregated prisoners to behave and conduct themselves in a certain way as imagined by the
prison guards (Foucault, 1995). The idea of disciplining prisoners is accordingly not
ensured by torture or other physical corrections, but instead by means of the gaze
internalized by the prisoners (1995). This process of discipline, found in Foucault’s
Discipline and Punish that analyzed the panoptic model, can at first glance be a paradigm
through which surveillance societies can be understood and analyzed.
The panoptic model assumes that prisoners are docile and perfectly adhere to the
expectations of the prison guards (Gallagher, 2010). In other words, the panopticon
functions by instilling within its prisoners the above-mentioned gaze, forcing them to
behave in a certain way. A study of surveillance consciousness explores various types of
consciousness that do not necessarily conform to “panoptic arrangements” (Lippert, 2009:
506). Whereas the panopticon requires conforming and highly disciplined subjects,
attending to the variations of surveillance consciousness reveals how subjects demonstrate
different thoughts about surveillance that are inconsistent with and unsuitable for those
relating to the docile effects of the panopticon.
Haggerty and Ericson (2000) conceptualize a model that would both supersede
Foucault’s analysis of the panopticon and serve as another framework for surveillance
research; this is called the surveillant assemblage (Haggerty & Ericson, 2000). Using
Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of rhizomatics as a starting point, Haggerty and Ericson
describe an assemblage as a “multiplicity of heterogeneous objects, whose unity comes
solely from the fact that these items function together, that they ‘work’ together as a
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functional entity” (Patton, 1994: 158, as cited in Haggerty & Ericson, 2000: 608). Their
argument to displace the panoptic mechanism and construct a new model suggests
“surveillance has become deterritorialized and operates as a heterogeneous network of
elements which spreads rhizomatically” (Wood, 2013: 319). It is important to note that
rather than strictly concentrate on top-down surveillance (or the state surveilling subjects),
the authors’ model addresses many different types of surveillance that are lateral, vertical,
and more (see Hier, 2003 for examples), to name a few.
Surveillant assemblages contrast starkly with the panopticon in that they allow for
different types of surveillance both temporally and spatially. These assemblages help
exhibit the development of ubiquitous surveillance (see Andrejevic, 2012). As noted above,
surveillance can be undertaken by several different social agents that are not fixed in one
space and/or time. Surveillant assemblages involve these never-ending rhizomes that
characterize the complex systems of surveillance (see Haggerty & Ericson, 2000: 614-9).
Though surveillant assemblages are important when conceptualizing contemporary
surveillance, they overlook what being surveilled from mobile technologies means for the
subject and what types of effects such surveillance may produce. Assemblages
surreptitiously require a form of consciousness – one that expects subjects to essentially
submit to these assemblages – allowing them to capture “data doubles” (see Haggerty &
Ericson, 2000: 606). If subjects resist surveillance even partially, part(s) of their data
doubles are then absent from a given set of interconnected assemblages. This is not the
case if one comfortably conforms to surveillance practices. As mentioned above, an
important feature to maintain the functioning of a surveillant assemblage is the need for its
elements to work together. Those who resist surveillance would ultimately disrupt and
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decrease these flows of information, in turn, affecting assemblages’ capacity to function
together. How subjects respond to this interconnected surveillance remains unclear, in turn,
blurring the ability to understand the convergence and divergence of these assemblages.
Focusing on surveillance consciousness has demonstrated how exactly subjects respond to
this surveillance made up of assemblages and whether subjects are, as Haggerty and
Ericson imply, seamlessly captured by them.
Subjects are constantly changing in their socialization, group dynamics, and
individual behaviours. In essence, being surveilled can be experienced in many ways. Some
may be interpellated (cf. Althusser, 2006; see Walby, 2005) as subjects of surveillance by
consciously responding or failing to respond to written signs notifying them they are under
surveillance (see Hier, 2010). Others may be completely oblivious to the idea of their every
move being tracked through Facebook and other mobile technological applications. Some
may be cognizant of being surveilled but do not resist because they simply prefer the
convenience of mobile applications in exchange. Finally, subjects may make every effort
to avoid being surveilled (see Harcourt, 2015); these subjects may be categorized as the
resisters of surveillance (see Leistert, 2012). As such, the accounts of subjective
understandings of surveillance explored through this thesis will provide a background that
illustrates the disparate subjective experiences of surveillance.
What have been commonly invoked in surveillance studies are the panopticon and
surveillant assemblage, speaking to how subjects are surveilled, by what means, and for
what purposes. Surveillance models tend to be “abstract, totalizing, passive […]
conceptions of surveillance” unable to account for “the messy, contradictory and
ambivalent responses of their participants” (Harper et al., 2013: 176). It is thus essential
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that the subjective experience of surveillance is studied to supplement or refine these
theories of surveillance. However, this thesis suggests that studying the subject of
surveillance is not necessarily a bottom-up investigation, but instead one that also considers
how surveillance apparatuses affect different understandings and experiences of
surveillance.

2. Research on Subjective Experiences of Surveillance
Despite some models and perspectives analyzing how subjects are surveilled, for what
purposes, and by what means, there is little literature focusing on the “experiential reality”
of subjects of surveillance (Harper et al., 2013: 175) and their responses to surveillance
(Bauman et al., 2014: 141). Some studies address opinions and attitudes about whether
subjects think Edward Snowden is a traitor or a savior, typically through survey research
(e.g. Reid, 2013). Others have taken more of a philosophical approach to exploring the
subject of surveillance by using Sartre’s work and a phenomenological framework (e.g.
Friesen, Feenberg, & Smith, 2009). The following will outline pertinent research to this
thesis that has addressed subjective responses to surveillance.
Best (2010) explores experiences of surveillance by users of “digital screen
technologies” (including computers and mobile phones) and employs a Deleuzian
conception of the control society to compare with the users’ experiences. Best’s findings
indicate how subjects believe their data to be undesirable for any surveillance apparatuses,
suggesting that their data lacks value. In other words, subjects understand surveillance as
something that does not specifically target whole populations, but rather only those deemed
suspicious (2010). Such an account does not locate those who are deeply concerned about
surveillance practices and/or their implications. Best’s research demonstrates that there
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appears to be, among subjects, much trust in governmental surveillance operations in the
pre-Snowden era. Many of those from whom experiences are captured are not necessarily
aware of surveillance techniques or what they entail. This is uncovered in the current study
by allowing further understanding and awareness of surveillance operations, which is
suggested to be an important feature to help capture understandings of surveillance.
Vermeersch and De Pauw (2017) conduct a framing experiment regarding the
effects of how information about surveillance can alter subjects’ perceptions of the
phenomenon. They seek to locate whether the type of information to which subjects are
exposed affects their acceptance or lack thereof regarding surveillance technologies. Here,
they point to subjects’ opinions regarding what they sometimes believe to be overly
complicated technologies. Such an opinion is due to subjects’ acceptance of certain
technologies, but also their feelings of being disturbed about possible implications of their
data being collected. Further, the authors refer to some literature that debates whether
acceptance of technologies is affected by the type of information given to those voicing
their opinions. The findings of Vermeersch and De Pauw’s work suggest that subjects are
not completely a product of the information to which they are exposed: “Individuals’
opinions are more than a mere reflection of the information offered to them at a given
moment and as such less variable and superficial than some […] may fear” (Vermeersch
& De Pauw, 2017: 66). This conclusion is consistent with this thesis’ focus on subjects
voicing their understanding of surveillance despite some information to which they are
exposed (see section on Data Sources and Methodology).
Some research has also focused on aspects of the ‘affective’ impacts of surveillance
by exploring dominant discourses such as privacy and security as they relate to surveillance
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(see Ellis, Tucker, & Harper, 2013). These, however, are not necessarily the only prevalent
discourses vis-à-vis surveillance. Surveillance technologies and practices can be perceived
through matters of, for example, convenience (see Harcourt, 2015) or trust (see Hampson
& Jardine, 2016). In addition, discourses such as security and privacy may be vague to
many. If definitions of these concepts are even partially agreed upon by the public, then
perhaps relying on such concepts may be beneficial; however, such terms are often
contested (see Moore, 2008) as displayed in later chapters of this thesis. This thesis
observes surveillance as a de-centralized set of practices with different underlying logics
and accounts for such phenomena when exploring everyday experiences of surveillance.
Ellis et al. (2013: 729) importantly acknowledge subjects’ insufficient level of lucidity
concerning “processes and functions” of surveillance.
Harper, Tucker, and Ellis (2013) examine subjects’ ‘knowledge and awareness’
concerning surveillance practices, principally those being exhausted by governmental
entities surveilling the public. They suggest that subjects’ knowledge and awareness of
surveillance are key to capturing their experiences of surveillance. Additionally, Harper et
al. express the limits of strictly focusing on a top-down understanding of surveillance and
aim to present a bottom-up approach. The actual experiences of subjects simply account
for the ‘bottom-up’, but researchers ought to simultaneously recognize that different
apparatuses of surveillance and security are able, to some degree, to govern subjective
mentalities (2013). Using quantitative studies preceding their research the authors also
emphasize the “contradictory nature” of discourse dealing with surveillance (2013: 181).
However, discourse of subjects is also shown to overlap in many cases. The overlap of
discourses is further elaborated in the methodology and findings sections of this thesis
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containing passages of subjective responses to surveillance, many of which have elements
of the different yet interrelated narratives of surveillance consciousness.
Green and Zurawski (2015) call for a holistic approach to researching subjective
experiences of surveillance in everyday life. Particularly, the authors propose that many
surveillance practices experienced by subjects are deemed ‘mundane’. This thesis suggests
that such practices are crucial concerning the dynamic relations between subjects and
others, or subjects and social institutions. Though surveillance may be mundane for those
who have normalized surveillance (see Lippert & Scalia, 2015), others may be much more
alert to certain practices and perceive surveillance with more significance in their lives.
Notwithstanding what Green and Zurawski term ‘unobservable’ (see 2015: 40) when
researching the subject of surveillance, investigating surveillance consciousness in this
thesis uncovers and attempts to account for such information.
Another study researches subjective experiences of surveillance by delving into the
increased surveillance to which police officers are subjected (Brown, 2016). Brown
examines police ‘use of force’ behaviour and whether being subject to surveillance, or
sousveillance (see Mann, Nolan, & Wellman, 2003), modifies officers’ use of force. A
major claim is that subjects of surveillance are disciplined to the extent that they are aware
of surveillance. He notes as an example Foucault’s panopticon which, as shown above, is
restricted to disciplinary surveillance practices. This surveillance is operative and effective
when the subject is docile, but how does this affect those who completely discount
surveillance efforts and persistently behave and act as if they are not being monitored? In
this study, the author mentions the officers being subject to surveillance from both civilians
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and a civilian oversight agency, both of which can induce a crucial sense of self-awareness
(2016).
It is important to reiterate that much research on surveillance and subjectivity was
completed during the pre-Snowden era (i.e. before June 9, 2013). Prior to the leaks
Snowden delivered to the public, many surveillance practices that operated behind closed
doors were seen by the public as conspiracies (see Reid, 2015). As such, further research
on subjects of surveillance following the Snowden revelations may locate understandings
of those who are much more aware and knowledgeable of surveillance given that the leaks
provided further information on all types of surveillance affecting each and every person.
In other words, post-Snowden subjects may be better able to articulate their understandings
of surveillance.
In brief, research on the subject’s understandings and experiences of surveillance
has uncovered an effect on docile subjects along with findings that subjects inherently
understand surveillance practices to be mundane. Surveillance discourse from subjects has
been shown to be contradictory, and the effects of surveillance have typically and
ultimately been suggested to be disciplinary. This thesis provides accounts of subjects’
understanding of surveillance that, like legal consciousness, overlap and offer complex
patterns regarding how subjects understand and experience surveillance. Surveillance
consciousness thus demonstrates what subjects do and say about surveillance. This allows
for a modification and development of existing and future models and perspectives of
surveillance given its focus on the binary of top-down and bottom-up approaches
concurrently.
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Ewick and Silbey’s (1998) legal narratives that comprise the notion of
consciousness are used in this thesis to explore different types of surveillance
consciousness displayed through subjects’ understandings. This is accomplished by not
necessarily emphasizing settings of surveillance such as the above-mentioned panopticon
but instead exploring subjects’ surveillance consciousness relating to dynamic mobile
technologies.
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III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
To reiterate, this thesis adopts Ewick and Silbey’s (1998) conception of legal consciousness
– a concept abstracted into three narratives that situate subjects’ experiences of law in
everyday life – and applies it to surveillance given its overwhelming importance and
growth in our lives (Lyon, 2007), similar to law in everyday life (Ewick & Silbey, 1998).
Interviewing hundreds of subjects in New Jersey, Ewick and Silbey seek to locate the
“place of law in American culture” (1998: xii). Upon analyzing their data, the authors
propose an account of legal consciousness that is comprised of a tripartite set of narratives
or schemas. Such schemas demonstrate how subjects understand the law, experience it, and
are affected by it in their lives. They serve as “generalizable procedures applied in the
enactment/reproduction of social life” (1998: 40).
For Ewick and Silbey, legal consciousness refers to how subjects experience the
law and “what [they] do as well as say about the law” (Silbey, 2008: 1) and is explored to
determine how law “sustains its institutional power” (Silbey, 2005: 323). Rather than
commonly refer to a state of mind concerning law – hence the concept of consciousness –
legal consciousness is exhibited through discourse about law in everyday life (Ewick &
Silbey, 1998). Most notably, legal consciousness is case-specific in that it does not remain
static (1998). It may often contain contradictions in one’s actual legal consciousness but
could also overlap (see Lippert, 2006). This thesis also investigates surveillance
consciousness as manifested through discourse about surveillance. Rather than focus on
types of surveillance conducted by certain social agents, this thesis explores surveillance
consciousness across different mobile technologies used by governments, corporations,
and more.
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The concept of consciousness in this thesis also follows Ewick and Silbey’s (1998:
39), that is, as a part of a reciprocal process in which the meanings given by subjects “to
their world become patterned, stabilized, and objectified. These meanings […] become part
of the material and discursive systems that limit and constrain future meaning making.” As
suggested by Ball (2009) and Di Domenico and Ball (2010), understanding the subject’s
point of view of surveillance is significant for comprehending the relationship between
those who surveil (e.g. governmental agencies) and those who are surveilled.
Thus, this thesis explores subjects’ viewpoints on mobile technologies concerning
surveillance. It adopts Ewick and Silbey’s (1998) heuristic and their conceptualization of
legal consciousness that draws on subjects’ accounts of their experiences of law in
everyday life. Respondents are said to engage with, conform before, or resist against the
law (1998), all of which are defined as follows. It is important to note, however, that Ewick
and Silbey’s heuristic is only used as a starting point for this thesis. A study of subjective
experiences of surveillance also reveals some themes that initially appear to be beyond the
scope of legal consciousness narratives, but are ultimately encapsulated by these abovementioned schemas.
The first schema of engaging with the law “is consistent with the notion that ‘[l]aw
is concrete, partial, flawed, and changing.’ It is ‘an arena of competitive tactical
maneuvering where the pursuit of self-interest is expected’ […] Law is a game, open to all,
but played best by legal professionals upon whom there is considerable reliance” (Lippert,
2006: 73). Engaging with the law further involves a game “in which pre-existing rules can
be deployed and new rules invented to serve the widest range of interests and values”
(Ewick & Silbey, 1998: 48). Simply put, laws are seen to be broken by other laws, rules by
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other rules (1998; cf. Ericson, 2007). Subjects engaging with the law are said to be more
concerned about those who are powerful enough to change and implement laws than the
procedures of the law itself. Translating to surveillance consciousness, subjects engaging
with surveillance may view surveillance as a game where they are able to, for instance,
falsely portray themselves online to those who are surveilling them for their own personal
interests such as gaining access to a convenient or entertaining website or application.
The second schema, conforming before the law, is summarized by Lippert (2006:
73) as one where “law is imagined as majestic, authoritative, and external. Law operates
‘by known rules in carefully delimited spheres’ […] Here law stands outside and above
social life.” In addition, law is expressed as a “[hierarchical] system of known rules and
procedures” that “transcends by its history and processes the persons and conflicts of the
moment” (Ewick & Silbey, 1998: 47). Those who conform before the law describe law as
an entity that is sacred and, upon coming in contact with everyday mundane life, heightens
the importance of the latter (1998). Here, legal procedure and legal construction are
accepted by subjects despite their possible indifference toward the results of these
procedures and constructions (1998). To be before surveillance may involve subjects
conforming to surveillance given its affiliation with governmental procedures. For
instance, those who suggest that drone surveillance is necessary for the protection of
national security may be situated before surveillance. Such subjects may succumb to a
perceived necessity of mobile technology surveillance for the protection of the state.
Finally, being up against the law involves “a particular understanding of self and
other, of being up against something or someone” (Ewick & Silbey, 2003: 1336). Here,
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tellers of resistance stories emplot 3 law as a powerful force, describe themselves as
a protagonist up against this force, and present some action that [avoids] or
[overcomes], if only temporarily, this situation of relative powerlessness. The act
of resistance is described in the conventional narrative form of opposition,
transformation, and moral victory (2003: 1345).
Types of resistance could include “[f]oot-dragging, omissions, ploys, small deceits, humor,
and making scenes” (Ewick & Silbey, 1998: 48). These forms of resistance against the law
can also be temporary, as some may only resist for a moment rather than constantly. In
many cases, resisting against the law can also be ways to “exact revenge” against legal
institutions, codes or actors (Ewick & Silbey, 1998: 48). However, “in resisting, people
seek diverse goals” (1998: 48). In short, this schema demonstrates that law can, at any
point, “be opposed, if just a little” (1998: 49). Similarly, subjects may be situated against
surveillance practices and those who conduct surveillance. They may respond to systems
of surveillance that they deem oppressive to them and resist their tactics of monitoring. For
example, an act as simple as placing a cover over a smartphone camera to protect
themselves from being seen by mobile applications can be resistant.

“Emplotment” is defined by Ewick and Silbey (2003: 1342) as “an account of how
things happened.”
3
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IV. DATA SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY
The question being asked by this thesis is about how surveillance through mobile
technologies – particularly drones and Stingrays – is understood by those who are
surveilled. The sub-questions of this thesis are: (1) How and to what extent do Ewick and
Silbey’s three narratives encapsulate subjective understandings of mobile technology
surveillance? (2) Does surveillance consciousness regarding mobile technologies vary
according to the type of media through which it is articulated? (3) Does surveillance
consciousness regarding mobile technologies vary by type of mobile technology
surveillance? And (4) how do people respond to the privacy and/or legal implications of
mobile technology surveillance?

1. Data Sources
Data collection entailed a systematically drawn, non-probability sample (see Tansey, 2007)
from social media discussions from the platforms ‘Twitter’ and ‘Reddit’ along with
comments on online news articles (both of which centre on the topic of mobile technology
surveillance) from two major news sources that commonly publish articles on surveillance:
The Guardian (US section) and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC). All data
examined and/or collected was situated in the post-Snowden era (i.e. following June 9,
2013).
The rationale for examining both Twitter and Reddit as social media platforms as
well as comments within the above-mentioned newspapers is as follows. It is important to
note that according to Debatin (2008: 64) “[t]he Web’s participatory features are
revitalizing public discourse and providing a new venue for public opinion." First, the
comments on online news articles (see Luscombe, Walby, & Lippert, 2017), or comments
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below the line (see Graham & Wright, 2015), in newspapers – The Guardian and CBC –
were used as data sources due to convenience, popularity, and legitimacy. Conlin and
Roberts (2016: 366) suggest that comments “on the news of the day [are] an important
function of the social discourse.” These newspapers are popular news sources in the US
and Canada (see “2016 Newspaper Web Rankings,” 2016). Furthermore, these newspapers
keep open to the public the comments contributed by those able to comment on articles,
namely, those who have profiles on and are presumably usual readers of the given
newspaper. Therefore, such sources admittedly limit the data retrieved to that which comes
from subjects who can (due to having profiles on or subscriptions with the given website)
access and post comments on these online news websites. 4 Notwithstanding this limitation,
the ability to post and view these comments has “grown exponentially in recent years”
(Canter, 2013: 604) with a caveat noted below.
Instead of exploring the nature of how news articles are delivered to the public and
in what ways media platforms portray the surveillance society in which we live, this thesis
examined comments in these news articles that have displayed thoughts about mobile
technology surveillance. Particularly, these comments contain discourse around the topic
of mobile technology surveillance with reflections from social actors as opposed to
sampling specific types of persons by their socioeconomic status, class, or other filtering

4

As a result, this research likely excluded the following: children unable to create profiles
on any of the above social media and online news sources due to age restrictions; those
who are incapable of reading and/or writing English, thus presumably being unable to
communicate with others through these media platforms; and subjects who make every
effort to completely avoid surveillance. That is, those who do not wish to subject their
opinions and/or information to surveillance will likely choose not to contribute to these
threads.
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factors.5 These comments are about surveillance through two mobile technologies: drones
and Stingrays. Thus, this thesis does not seek to analyze news articles themselves, but
instead subjects’ responses to such news articles and issues therein.
Considering social media, Twitter is a popular source comprised of millions of
users who frequently use key words and hashtags (Pervin et al., 2015). It is a platform that
has recently and successfully been used for qualitative research analysis (see Brock, 2012;
Weller, 2014; Wu & Shen, 2015; Trilling, 2015; Borgmann et al., 2016). Notably, Twitter
was reported to be home to approximately 328 million monthly users in 2017 (Statista,
2017). According to Aslam (2017), most of these users range from ages 18 to 29
(representing 37 percent of users) and 30 to 49 (representing 25 percent of users). Twitter
enables the public to search for and observe tweets without being a user of the platform.
Its ‘advanced search’ function gives access to the public to search tweets by words
mentioned and those preceded by hashtags; for example, a relevant search on Twitter
would be for the words ‘drone surveillance’. In addition, Twitter allows the public to filter
tweets by geographic region to limit searches to specific countries, a feature that allowed
retrieval of tweets from Canada and the US – two of the ‘five eyes’ of surveillance (see
Lyon, 2015a; Gill, 2015). To reiterate, the searches conducted for this thesis were limited
during Twitter searches to data from the post-Snowden era.
The second social media platform used to collect comments to capture surveillance
consciousness was Reddit. This social media platform offered a unique and integrated
medium through which data was collected for a few reasons. The operating process behind

5

This limitation and others of this thesis are discussed in the conclusion.
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many Reddit pages involves users posting an online news article ranging by topic and news
source (e.g. The Globe and Mail, The New York Times, etc.). Many Reddit pages chosen
for the acquisition of data for this thesis included both large- and small-scale news sources.
This provides two unique functions for the current study. First, these articles are posted on
Reddit with a link allowing visits to the primary source webpage. As a result, Reddit users
may or may not read the given news article to further acquaint themselves with the topic.
Second, Reddit users are then able to comment (on Reddit and not the primary news source
webpage) and debate with other Reddit users about the given article. Indeed, the function
of such an online space resembles the operation of comments below the line.
Rather than using one of either social media platforms or comments below the line,
data was collected from both types of sources. Regarding comments below the line, online
newspapers provided a homogenous set of data coming from subscribers to a newspaper.
Such users are presumably usually referring to the same online newspaper to access their
daily news. In contrast, both social media platforms undoubtedly offered a more
heterogeneous group who do not necessarily observe the news through only one online
newspaper. For example, according to Barthel, Stocking, Holcomb, and Mitchell (2016)
70 percent of Reddit users follow daily news through Reddit. This distinction was crucial
to addressing one of this thesis’ research questions regarding surveillance consciousness
varying across data sources.
It is worth noting the difficulty that arose while selecting these sources for the
current study, particularly concerning online newspapers. In previous years, most online
newspapers provided a ‘comment below the line’ section for each published article. This
privilege was quite recently removed from many different online newspapers due to online
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harassment, bullying, etc., occurring within digital debates regarding various topics. Some
noteworthy examples of sources removing their comment sections include the Toronto
Star, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), and the Washington Post (see Lat,
2016).
As such, seeking appropriate sources for the current study proved difficult due to
this recent burgeoning of comment shutdowns. However, the most obviously important
feature that was required and maintained involved the online newspaper’s tendency to
publish articles concerning surveillance and privacy. For example, The Guardian was one
of the first sources to release Snowden’s leaks to the public; this justified an examination
of this source – a source that provided comment sections on all its articles. The CBC,
however, does not support an identical sense of leniency with comments on every article.
Instead, CBC now handpicks the articles under which comment sections are permitted
(McGuire, 2014). As a result, some selected articles (selection process outlined below) did
not have comment sections and were thus excluded.

2. Data Collection Procedures
Considering which articles and tweets were selected, the approach for this thesis was as
follows for each of the four sources. Table 1 and Table 2 (see Appendix A) provide an
overview of how these procedures were followed for comments below the line and social
media posts, respectively. A list containing every article from The Guardian and CBC, as
well as posts from Reddit that were selected for this thesis can be found in Appendix B.
First, The Guardian’s default search was changed from the UK to the US edition.
The search toolbar was used to search for “drone surveillance” and “Stingray surveillance”
as well these phrases in opposite order to gather a comprehensive list of articles. These
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searches generated lists of online news articles pertaining to the mobile technologies and
surveillance. From these articles, every second article was chosen given that all articles
from The Guardian allow comments below the line. Upon selecting an article, the title of
the given article was required to have a mobile technology within it (or the word
“surveillance”), and the date of publication was checked to ensure it was in the postSnowden era. This was followed by a brief examination of the article’s content to acquire
any context needed to grasp the meaning of comments. Assessing each article ensured that
all, in some broad sense, referred to mobile technology surveillance. Articles that did not
relate to the given technology and surveillance were excluded. The article immediately
following this excluded article was then selected and assessed in similar fashion. Following
this assessment, every second comment – regardless of its content – was collected and
added to the complete dataset. The content of comments was disregarded for the collection
process to remove any sampling selection biases (see Berk, 1983). Finally, if a thread
containing dialogue was present in response to a selected comment, up to five comments
in the thread were collected before proceeding to other comments and/or threads. Up to 30
comments per article were selected.
The collection of CBC comments followed a similar pattern to The Guardian with
some minor exceptions. Given that the CBC chooses the articles under which to allow
comments, following my search for news articles was a brief assessment to ensure
comments were available for a given article. The number of articles that included
comments below the line were not as common as The Guardian’s; this may also have been
due to the post-Snowden timeline requirement for the current study. As such, all articles
containing comments below the line were selected and included. The number of comments
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with and without threads remained consistent with the procedure used for The Guardian’s
data collection.
The data collection procedure used for Reddit, unlike Twitter, was also like the
procedure for comments below the line. Identical search phrases of “drone surveillance”
and “Stingray surveillance” were entered to search for relevant posts, and every second
post was selected provided it contained the name of the given mobile technology (or the
word “surveillance”) within its title. Upon completing an assessment of each selected post,
every second comment (up to 20 comments) was selected from each post as well as up to
five from any conversational thread.
Finally, the procedure used for Twitter was slightly different from the initial search
options. The advanced search option was used to enter the search phrases. These phrases
were used as “keywords” to search for as opposed to hashtags given that keyword searches
also included such terms being used within hashtags. To avoid having to endlessly scroll
through years of tweets, many of which may be irrelevant, several searches were conducted
in half-year increments to ensure that tweets from each year had an equal chance of being
chosen. Though there were a limited number of tweets available as discussed below, this
procedure allowed the collection of all tweets relating to mobile technology surveillance.
This preceded the selection of every fifth tweet. However, some searches produced users
tweeting only a link to an article about mobile technology surveillance. If a tweet contained
such a link and was identical to another selected tweet, the second tweet was treated as null
and the immediately following tweet was selected. This can also be expressed in a
‘retweet’, a type of tweet also omitted for this study. In some cases, tweets were offered by
“verified” accounts which was clear by “the blue verified badge [that] lets people know
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that an account of public interest is authentic” (“About verified accounts,” 2017). Lastly,
up to five tweets in a single thread were selected prior to proceeding to other tweets and/or
threads.

3. Data Analysis
The data above was examined through a discourse analysis of manifest content (see van
den Hoonard, 2012). “Discourse,” according to Philips and Hardy (2002: 3), “in general
terms, refers to actual practices of talking and writing.” Wood and Kroger (2000: 4, as cited
in van den Hoonard, 2012: 139) argue regarding discourse that “language is not only a tool
that describes reality but also a ‘social practice, a way of doing things’”. That is, “discourse
constitutes […] social life” (2012: 139) and is limited in definition. According to Parker
(1997: 292, as cited in Harper et al., 2013: 178), “an account of discourse should be able
to identify the ways in which processes of ideology and power find their way into the little
stories of everyday life.” Thus, in conducting a discourse analysis a researcher’s job is to
explore how it is that discourse is shaped by these mentalities but also how such discourse
“create[s] the social world,” “how language [shapes] experiences” (van den Hoonard,
2012: 140), and how “social reality is made real through discourses” (Philips & Hardy,
2002: 3) of surveillance. As Harper et al. (2013: 185) explain, upon using discourse
analysis to explore experiences of surveillance, researchers can “‘map’ possible forms of
subjectivity within discourses and this may be one way of defining the effects of living in
and through systems of widespread surveillance.”
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V. FINDINGS
A total of 896 comments and tweets (hereinafter, comments/excerpts) were selected from
the four sources and inputted into NVivo – a qualitative and mixed-methods analysis
software program. This software allowed me to organize the large amount of data into
folders and to code it under different themes, or “nodes,” created for the current study. In
addition, NVivo allowed me to use complex tools of analysis such as comparison and
hierarchical visuals, some of which are displayed as figures in this thesis. As such, the
comments collected were coded exactly 1,219 times to one or more of many nodes and
sub-nodes (several of which are detailed in the following chapter). Many comments were
coded with more than one node.
After separating online newspaper comments and social media comments into two
separate NVivo files, the data exhibited some variation of surveillance consciousness from
one medium to another. Figure A displays a breakdown of the overarching forms of
surveillance consciousness in the online newspaper data, and Figure B offers a similar
illustration for social media posts (see Appendix B). Correspondingly, Figure C and Figure
D exhibit a breakdown of these schemas pertaining to each mobile technology (see
Appendix B). As mentioned above, there were several themes found, but the
aforementioned Figures display three surveillance consciousness schemas and an “other”
section, analyzed as what was seemingly beyond the scope of legal consciousness schemas.
However, this “other” section is later shown to actually befit the three schemas. Most
importantly, there was overlap on several occasions between two or more of these themes.
There was very little difference found across the two types of media concerning these major
categories of surveillance consciousness as shown in the Figures.
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This section outlines key findings from the analysis of the hundreds of comments.
I coded the data into several nodes to gather insights about surveillance consciousness.
Each excerpt was coded as being with, before, and/or against surveillance as well as the
“other” section; this latter section was used to explore whether the excerpts contained a
schema beyond surveillance consciousness’ original schemas. In other words, if an excerpt
was determined to ultimately befit at least one of the three original schemas but contained
one aspect that seemingly did not fit, then the excerpt was categorized as “other” and as an
original schema. I then located consistent themes that were prevalent in the excerpts in
addition to the above-mentioned schemas; these themes also befit the surveillance
consciousness schemas.
The first section of this chapter expounds on these noteworthy themes that
correspond with the original surveillance consciousness narratives. Section 2 of this
chapter further explores the presence of Ewick and Silbey’s (1998) schemas as part of
surveillance consciousness by showing how the three are present in the latter’s constituents.
Section 3 emphasizes the “other” section noted above by identifying two themes that, at
first glance, partially deviated from the three original schemas. The first theme relates to
subjects’ understanding of the surveillance society with adherence to Agamben’s (2005)
State of Exception. The second theme involves the temporal aspect of surveillance
consciousness, where subjects are seen as visionaries. Upon further analysis of this “other”
section, its two components were discerned to seamlessly befit surveillance consciousness
schemas of being with, before, and against surveillance.
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1. Prevalent Themes
1.1 ‘Got Nothing to Hide’
Of the most common arguments made by those who simply do not regard
surveillance practices as intrusive and disturbing, the “nothing to hide” response (see
Solove, 2007, 2011) is at the forefront. This argument was made by subjects through all
types of media, and although it could be placed categorically under the theme of ‘privacy
issues’, it is understood for some as the opposite of an issue. Instead, subjects use this trivial
argument asserting that “there is no threat to privacy” (Solove, 2007: 746). These subjects
maintain that their actions have always been law-abiding and just, deeming their actions
permissible (2007). The data is consistent with Solove’s (2007: 747) argument that “the
argument reflects the sentiments of a wide percentage of the population.”
The following excerpts show the “nothing to hide” argument present in various
contexts of discourse surrounding mobile technology surveillance:6
RCMP can tap into my cellphone all they want…. they’ll be paying a federal officer
$100k/year to be bored to tears…! (CS6)
A method to intercept cell calls without a warrant means that everyone’s
communications are being surveilled without legal authority. End of story. Mind
over matter. If you don’t mind, it doesn’t matter. Just roll over and go back to sleep.
If you’ve got nothing to hide, why would you care? (CS1)
Who cares? If the police use this to catch the criminal, I couldn’t care less if they
also read every “LOL” I text. I have nothing to hide. Only criminals do. (CS2)
I haven’t done anything wrong so I’m not worried about the police listening in.
Good work Vancouver Police! (CS2)
What’s the big issue with monitoring cell phones? If you’re not doing anything
illegal, you have nothing to worry about. (CS5)
6

The comments referenced in this thesis were corrected only for spelling and punctuation
errors as well as homophones (e.g. their vs. there) to assist the reader.
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I give the RCMP full permission to listen or see any or all of my phone calls and
texts. […] I still believe that if you’ve done nothing wrong, you can’t be charged
for something. […] They’re not interested in my wife texting me to bring home
pizza. (CS3)
Similarly, social media users express comparable positions when using the “nothing to hide
argument”:
Dance like no one is watching and don’t sweat it. (RD5)
I have nothing to hide and reject the idea of #police state #Stingray #secret
surveillance. (TS)
[…] but at the same time my cellphone conversations are literally just talking to my
family about everyday stuff. I’m only one individual in this and personally have
nothing to hide. If EPS [Edmonton Police Service] wants to listen in on my
conversation with my mom about how hard it is to find a good sports bra, then go
ahead. (RS7)
The final excerpt above suggests an understanding that surveillance does not warrant the
subject’s daily activities and communications useful to the grand surveillance system;
instead, surveillance practices seamlessly gloss over the subject’s data with the intention
to only catch those who are willingly concealing something. In other words, if subjects
have nothing to hide then what are described as their mundane lives are certainly not of
interest to any surveillance programs. As such, a suggestion offered by many is that
subjects need not worry if they do not engage in deviant behaviour. Solove (2007: 753)
eloquently summarizes the argument:
The NSA surveillance, data mining, or other government information-gathering
programs will result in the disclosure of particular pieces of information to a few
government officials, or perhaps only to government computers. This very limited
disclosure of the particular information involved is not likely to be threatening to
the privacy of law-abiding citizens. Only those who are engaged in illegal activities
have a reason to hide this information.
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Despite the prevalence of this argument, many other subjects oppose what they
deem to be a trivial argument at best. The opposition suggests that proponents of the
argument are missing the crucial point or the big picture. The allegedly overused argument
is questioned and countered in several ways:
Ah the good old “we can already find things about you so what could a little more
hurt” argument…Except the difference is that this is government surveillance with
the express purpose of keeping track of you, you have absolutely no idea what are
the capabilities of the drones… (RD1)
When I read comments “you have nothing to fear or it is becoming a police state”
I could cry out loud we do have something to fear […] and are already living in a
police state now! (GD1)
[…] The reason this is a big deal is in a free society the police don’t get to make up
the laws or how they are enforced. […] The point [is] that the police and security
service in our country shouldn’t be acting outside of the law. […] These are
safeguards, because every now and then a PM or a leader comes along and says
he has an “enemies list.” […] It’s our safeguards that keep us from being […]
taken away in the night not because you did something illegal, but [also] held
beliefs or opinions that a more authoritarian leader thinks are threatening to his
power. (CS3)
Everyone sort of says that until the stuff they had to hide gets exposed. Planned
adultery, actual adultery, lying on the resume, financial issues, bigotry and racism
and chauvinism and misogyny, drug abuse and heavy drinking, their criminal
record (including crimes for which they were never convicted, like juvie
vandalism), speeding, habitually lying […] …the list goes on and on. I laugh when
I hear people say that they have nothing to hide. Of course they do – everyone does.
They just don’t think they’ll get nailed for anything. (CS5)
Opponents of the argument admit that every person does have something to hide. Without
receiving a response from others, one subject responds to a “nothing to hide” commenter
by demanding that the commenter submit their information to the subject. What is pointed
out by the subject denotes information that is likely digital by nature.
Why don’t I post an e-mail here. You can send me all your text messages, transcripts
of phone calls, your e-mail accounts and passwords. Banking information, account
#’s and passcodes. You’ll be fine with that right? Didn’t think so. (CS5)
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Here, the subject removes the notion of police, government, or any commercial enterprise
and pompously brings him/herself to the position of controlling another’s data. From this
comment, one can infer that subjects cannot bring themselves to openly disclose their
information to a stranger (in this case one single person); they would not easily permit the
disclosure of such information to an entire police force, governmental body or commercial
enterprise.
The comments above containing the ‘nothing to hide’ argument can, in some ways,
overlap with the three narratives of legal consciousness. For example, the final comment
above (CS5) contains a subtle hint of the subject being against surveillance. This is shown
by the subject’s condescending “didn’t think so” following the subject’s suggestion to
others. Furthermore, subjects believing in the ‘nothing to hide’ argument can be perceived
as those who would willingly give up their data, simply standing before surveillance. For
example, the belief that oneself does not matter to the grand scheme of things could be
inferred as subjects feeling the overwhelming grandeur of the surveillance society, leaving
subjects with a sense of powerlessness. However, a comment like the second-to-last one
(CS5) above portrays an opponent’s side of the argument, where the fact that subjects do
have something to hide shows them to be up against the surveillance society.
1.2 Military and Police Use of Mobile Technology Surveillance
Of all the data for the current study, the most commonly used word within the
excerpts was “police.” It was associated with over 200 texts. Subjects either praised or
blamed the police and/or military for the surveillance to which they are subjected. Stingrays
have commonly and primarily been affiliated with law enforcement’s use of the device to
collect what is known as metadata (see Newell & Tennis, 2013; Schneier, 2014 for

35
definitions of metadata). Likewise, drones are shown to be associated with federal and
municipal police services as well as federal agencies such as the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) and the military for purposes of both surveillance and military drone strikes.
As West and Bowman (2016: 650) note, drones “are the signature weapon of modern
warfare.” This is expressed by one subject supporting military drone use, suggesting that
[t]his is an excellent tool to be used for monitoring our coastlines and the far north.
Drones will save lives and costs carrying out these missions. If push comes to shove
drones with the capability to "shoot back" are absolutely necessary. The modern
battlefield demands technology on this level. (CD3)
Here, drones are weapons that can strike the opposition to defend one’s own nation. Such
devices are said to be required for the “modern battlefield” that has gone beyond human
warfare techniques; these positions display subjects to be situated before surveillance,
ultimately disregarding the notion of surveillance for the defense of the nation. Another
subject similarly calls drones a “no-brainer” and proposes specific types of drones for
warfare:
Drones are a no-brainer. And we need to listen to the RCAF [Royal Canadian Air
Force] - surveillance and weapons capacity is needed. Reaper drones and the
Global Hawk are possible choices. We need to face up to defence needs in the 21st
Century. (CD3)
However, other subjects describe the potential of drone usage for warfare. The lack of
drones is said to be detrimental to a nation, as one subject responds to a drone surveillance
article:
Drones are cheaper and a mandatory component future of warfare so this is a nonstarter unless you want to see Canada even further behind than it is militarily.
There may be a way to still maintain capability despite likely budget cutbacks to
come. (CD3)
Yet others do not view drones as beneficial tools for warfare and the protection of
a nation. Instead, a concern with drones is articulated concerning their capacities of
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engaging with surveillance or battle strikes. One subject speaks to the inevitability of
drones carrying the function of weaponry:
I find it difficult to understand why anyone would ever think that these drones would
NOT have munitions... they are only used in places of severe conflict and war. We
do have cameras on light poles and helicopters for looking at the traffic on the Don
Valley Parkway. This is for military use only not traffic surveillance. (CD3)
Interestingly, one subject offers a hypothetical situation to follow such that military
accountability is maintained. That is, the subject insists that such a solution would facilitate
the military managing itself appropriately:
If a country wants to make sure that their drone program is held to the highest level
of accountability, all they need do is make it so that 60 days after any drone flight,
the recording of the flight is automatically uploaded to the internet. For national
security, no audio would be uploaded, as they might discuss how they got the
information that lead them there, but the video would be tagged with a unique
identifier so that government officials could request the full record, including
mission details, pilot, CO, and control room audio. Do that, and the military will
police itself quite effectively. (CD3)
These above excerpts were all comments below the line of the same article about the
possibilities of using drones for lethal force beyond or in addition to surveillance. This
article was only one of few that also focused on military use of drones and elicited
responses about the topic.
Regarding police, surveillance consciousness towards law enforcement channeled
a negative undertone whereby police could not be trusted, that police are performing
warrantless surveillance, or that a loss of respect toward police occurred due to these
practices. Such thoughts about police ultimately show subjects being situated against
surveillance. The following are some examples of excerpts regarding police use of mobile
technology surveillance:
At least back in the late 70's, the police had to get a court warrant to fly helicopters
over suspected marijuana plantings in California's northwest. Now, the police do
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whatever illegal function they want until someone tells then it is a no-no and to
stop, which is rare. (GD5)
There was a time that I had respect for the police. Sadly, that respect has been lost.
Weird that it coincided with the advent of cell phone cameras. […] This story will
fester for a few days, someone will leak information, there will be an investigation
and then they will finally admit they have "bent" the law and apologize. (CS1)
The first comment refers to an historical timeline where police were once seen to be
operating and abiding by the law. The second commenter expresses lack of respect for
police, and the final comment similarly refers to the trust the subject once had in law
enforcement. Uniquely, one subject referred to and opposed the use of Stingrays by police
during protests, suggesting such a practice to be unconstitutional:
These are now routinely used at all protests. […] Because they don't have warrants
that would allow them to use this information against a person in court, police find
other ways that they could have "found" the information, usually creating some
kind of informant or other fiction. […] [T]hey can't fess up to it as a source of their
information in court, no one can challenge them on it. This is even more
unconstitutional […] than NSA phone and internet collection surveillance. (GS3)
Overall, most times police were mentioned in the discourse, these references were
coupled with a feeling that law enforcement would surreptitiously use mobile technology
surveillance for deleterious reasons such as targeting specific individuals, regardless of
whether they had committed a criminal act. Here, law enforcement is oppressive, thus
illustrating subjects’ position against surveillance. Despite the type of negative comments
found in each source, those who supported police and military use of these devices
aggressively opposed their adversaries by justifying such use. In many cases, these subjects
allege the notion of crime7 as justification. One subject specifies that due to the

7

This section also contains one subsection of the chapter focusing particularly on crime
and surveillance.
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proliferation of drones, “now every yahoo is a potential menace to life, safety and privacy”
(CD2), showing that potential criminals are feared and may have their own access to certain
devices. As such, drones and Stingrays in the hands of police are seen to be acceptable for
some, as one subject posits, “[t]he RCMP has no interest at all in listening to your nonsecurity involved calls. They have better things to do with their time. Using this technology
is a good thing to keep Canada safe” (CS3).
1.3 Lacking Resistance and Blaming the Citizenry
In a later section about subjects situated against surveillance, I discuss how people
claim to resist or have previously resisted mobile technology surveillance. The current
subsection displays a located theme about subjects referring to others’ techniques of
resistance rather than their own. In other words, these subjects await others to resist mobile
technology surveillance for utilitarian reasons and insinuate such resistance is required
regardless of whether the end goal is achieved. They see resistance as lacking and are thus
awaiting someone or something to resist surveillance. Through these understandings, it was
also discovered that given the lack of resistance by many citizens, many subjects argue that
citizens have brought mobile technology surveillance on themselves vis-á-vis submitting
to the convenience of mobile technologies (see Harcourt, 2015). Indeed, subjects blame the
public for willingly taking their own steps to completely subjugate themselves to mass
surveillance.
Awaiting resistance or someone to act against surveillance does not indicate
subjects who are necessarily situated against surveillance. Those who await resistance or
speak to the lack of resistance are not particularly resisting surveillance themselves and are
thus categorized differently from their resistant counterparts. One subject posed a question
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to others asking what they are going to start doing about mass surveillance: “I think enough
words have been said. The CIA is our enemy. What are we gonna start doing about it?”
(GD6). Another subject communicates to others what must be done to resist this mass
surveillance and what others need to realize, as the subject states:
Dear God. When did we arrive at this dystopian future? We’ve got to realize the
intentions of governments and states across the world. Their very purpose now […]
is control, monitoring and surveillance of their civilian population for a variety of
ends. And we must, for the sake of anything resembling freedom begin to protect
ourselves against it, because appealing to civil liberties and rights has become, as
we are seeing, utterly meaningless. (GD1)
This excerpt suggests the public fails to protect its own legal and democratic rights and, as
a result, places some blame on others while awaiting resistance.
Other excerpts show a transition from the theme of ‘awaiting resistance’ towards
blaming the public for willingly allowing this mobile technology surveillance to
consistently hover over everyday life. One subject’s sentiment displays this noteworthy
transition in a response to an article regarding thousands of legal cases being overturned
due to police Stingray use:
What boggles my mind is how many sheep in this country actually believe that the
police and all other authoritarian agencies are doing anything by the law to protect
us citizens. The whole justice and legal system [expletive] with its citizens,
considers us all as state controlled sheep. You all need to wake up and start fighting
back against the system and the government. We the people need to have our
revolution finally. We need to bring justice to the citizens of this country and kick
out the corrupt judicial system. (GS1)
Evidently, this excerpt suggests that others need to awaken to their surroundings before it
is too late. Pointing to others, this subject refers to some of the public as “sheep” who
cannot help in the defense against the surveillance society. Other subjects speak more
explicitly about how the citizenry is at fault:
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The American People have handed over the pink slip to their country. This is what
happens when freedom isn't valued anymore. (GS4)
Isn't all their portable e-junk technology just super duper wonderful? […] Ever
since it came along it's not just our privacy, but also so many other 'life' aspects
have been getting progressively worse because of it. […] This technology was
supposed to make society/mankind even smarter, but for most who've embraced it
nothing could be further from that truth […]. Sadly, there's far too many/sheeple
who are now in too far deep to reject it. (CS4)
This is why you don't carry tracking/bugging devices with you everywhere you go.
Let people think you're nuts if you don't carry around a cell. Not like it's impossible
to carry a little black book to write down phone numbers. Today, you're crazy if
you worry about your phone coming pre-bugged. 40 years ago, you'd be crazy
to buy a pre-bugged phone. (RS1)
Gone is any doubt that anyone might have had that government surveillance must
be carefully and completely controlled to assure constitutionality and legality.
Well, maybe not. There are some who really want a police state. (GS1)
What is common among the above excerpts is the belief that the public incorrectly allows
themselves to be subject to surveillance either for purposes of convenience or because they
are ignorant of mass surveillance and similar complexities. These are sweeping and
generalizing excerpts that portray an understanding of societies holistically. However, one
subject questions others’ worry of Stingrays, for example, given subjects’ constant use of
social networking and related platforms:
You worry about Stingrays? Wake up people, everything you say or do online is
monitored for starters, which includes Facebook, any social media, emails, etc.
And apparently these spy agencies can even access your home security cameras,
webcams, TVs and any appliances that use cameras or microphones. (CS6)
Once again, this subject proposes that others need to be awakened to acknowledge how
they are being surveilled. The subject refers to the common parts of subjects’ everyday
lives that result in subjects being surveilled (e.g. using social media).
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Similarly, one subject refers to devices being captured by Stingrays but points to
security issues within the devices and the subject’s surprise that others still use devices
such as cellular phones:
It just points again to the lack or security surrounding cell phones and the software
that runs on them. I am surprised that anyone would use these devices for
communications such as to whistleblowers demanding absolute anonymity. Surely
everyone must be aware by now that modern technologies can eavesdrop without
being safeguarded by good encryption. (CS4)
As one subject blatantly puts it, “[a]ll life is grass. Wake up people, we humans are a
cancer of the planet” (GD4). This comment suggests that the public is at fault for the
current surveillance society; a similar comment refers to subjects’ dependence on
technology as a catalyst: “People don’t care as long as they can eat and drink, watch reality
television and dream of winning the National Lottery” (GD1).
1.4 Surveillance and Terrorism
Since September 11, 2001 (hereinafter, 9/11) the act of terrorism from both external
and internal threats to Canada and the US has been a vital risk turned to by governments
for the purpose of maintaining national security through surveillance measures, as “[t]he
War on Terror [has] resulted in forms of surveillance with little or no judicial oversight”
(Walby, Lippert, Warren, & Palmer, 2016: 7). Citizens of Western nations have been
commonly reminded that such surveillance practices “keep them safe, especially from
terrorism” (Walby et al., 2016: 1). However, as noted by Monahan (2012: 289),
“technological surveillance seems to have had very little success in stopping attempted
terrorism since 9/11.” A similar postulation is evident in subjects’ understandings of mobile
technology surveillance and terrorism. One subject illustrates this in reference to Stingrays
by suggesting that terrorists have not been located via surveillance:
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I’ll just go ahead and say it…..Hitler would have LOVED to have had his hands on
this!! Land of the FREE my [expletive]!! Irony: Using OUR confiscated money
against US..AND…they can’t locate “terrorists”?! (GS4)
Further, the notions of terrorism along with national security are seen by some
subjects to be used as mere excuses for governmental agencies to engage in mobile
technology surveillance. In other words, surveillance is said to be an intrusive technique to
socially control the public through mass practices in the name of national security. For
example, one subject responds to an article briefly touching on denied freedom of
information (FOI) requests about Stingrays and their use by the Vancouver Police
Department (VPD):
How the hell can the VPD deny a FOI request asking a general question? ARE
YOU USING SPOOF CELL TOWERS? I firmly believe in ‘law-and-order’ but they
answer to the public! And I am sick and tired of the government and police using
the ‘national security’ and ‘protecting sources/methods’ argument. What about our
personal and privacy security? (CS1)
Other subjects similarly see the protection of national security as an excuse, illustrated by
the following:
So... they are criminalizing guys with RC toys that happen to have a camera but
opening the door for the government to use them any way they want for "public
safety"... (RD8)
If they become too cheap and easy they won’t simply be used and rescues like
Helicopters are today, but could fly routine patrols over neighbourhoods. With
battery powered drones that fly back to their base station to recharge themselves
and take off again, this could easily happen. The excuse, if one is even needed, will
either be that they are needed to fight the failed war on drugs, or terrorism. (RD2)
But subjects also seem to suggest everyday crimes are fought through tactics initially aimed
to address acts of terrorism. One subject epitomizes this sentiment: “[L]aw enforcement
using ‘terrorism’ to obtain surveillance technology to fight regular crime” (TS). The
transition from the implementation of a surveillance technology from one purpose to
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another (e.g. terrorism to common crime) has been defined in research as function creep
(see Monahan, 2007: 378; Greenleaf, 2007; Ball, 2010: 92), which has been established for
many mobile technologies used for surveillance.
Contrarily, many subjects perceive terrorism and national security as legitimate
factors justifying governmental agencies and police services to engage in surveillance
practices to gather intelligence. Such understandings would ordinarily coincide with
subjects being before surveillance. One argument relates to the ‘nothing to hide’ argument
where the subject posits that
if you’re not doing anything wrong or illegal why the fuss? When you’re riding the
rail and it blows up don’t blame the police for not doing their surveillance. Give
me a break. You want security but don’t want them to do their job with better
equipment than the terrorists or criminals. (CS6)
This comment seemingly refers to the inevitability of a tragic event occurring without the
implementation of surveillance by law enforcement. Uniquely, one comment almost
opposes the ‘nothing to hide’ argument but identically concludes that surveillance is
warranted for national security:
Most of us lead mundane cell phone lives. Sexting…. is probably as wild as it gets.
But many have things to hide. I would rather have my sexting overheard than the
plans of some wackos, terrorists or whatever… not heard… (CS6)
A similar comment – in response to many negative reactions to an article – questions
whether people would rather endure surveillance or terrorist attacks:
Another terrorism related arrest this week! What exactly are you proposing? Do
you want people to get gunned down at a hockey game or blown up at a Starbucks?
(CS3)
In opposition to any possibility of terrorism, another subject posits that Stingrays are useful
tools to investigate not only potential terrorists but also those with whom they associate:
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On the one hand we have terrorists planning their dirty deeds and drug dealers
who are profiting from their sales exploiting the masses for profit. How do you stop
them? This is one good tool by the looks of it. Anyone connecting with known
numbers of terrorists and or drug dealers gets tagged and investigated. (CS1)
As shown above, the notion of terrorism in combination with surveillance was
prevalent in the discourse. Indeed, many subjects were shown to see surveillance and
national security as mere excuses used by governments to surveil the population at large.
Such opposition to surveillance proposed suggestions like, “F security, I’ll keep my liberty
thanks” (GS7). In response to the opposition, proponents of surveillance argue that
surveillance practices are worth any intangible price given their prevention of terrorist
activity. These subjects imply that without surveillance, they would fail to be protected and
would thus inevitably be exposed to threats internal and external to their given nation. Here,
we find an answer conveyed as a reminder to the excerpt from GS7, as one subject
responds, “[t]ell that to the widows and orphans from 9/11” (GS7).
1.5 Literature, Film and Snowden
In previous scholarship, surveillance has been shown to be “influenced by popular
culture, as the media can shape our attitudes and actions towards surveillance” (Kammerer,
2012: 99). Many subjects throughout all sources for the current study referred to literature,
film, and even Snowden’s leaks in the media. We can begin with the countless moments
where subjects use Orwell’s 1984 to help describe the current societies in which they live.
According to Kammerer (2012: 100), 1984 is “the most famous cultural expression” given
that the “[e]vocations of a menacing ‘Big Brother’ have become commonplace in
discussions about surveillance and control.” Indeed, Kammerer (2012: 100) was correct in
his assertion that “debates about whether or not Orwell was ‘right’ in his predictions” have
increased.
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The following excerpts refer to Orwell’s predictions in his famous book and how
they have now come to fruition in the 21 st century:
This is no big surprise. You are being watched right now, everything you do is
recorded. This is 1984 and big brother is more prevalent than ever. (CS3)
This is clearly "Big Brother" ideology... who must watch all citizens to determine
how illegal they are... not if they're innocent... as police in Canada may consider
all of us guilty of something. […] George Orwell wrote the book... Canadian law
enforcement is bringing it to reality! (CS6)
Big Brother: Flying to a City near you Soon. (RD2)
[…] Orwell’s prediction seems to be coming true .. just a bit later than he thought.
(CS5)
1984 is just a little late, but it's up and running now. (GD5)
[…] it has become an Orwellian nightmare from which there is no awakening. The
only respite is death. (GD4)
I was going to say that 'you couldn't make it up' but someone already has... George
Orwell, I think it was. (GD5)
[…] Anyone that uses cell phones or the internet has to assume Big Brother is
watching. There is no privacy when it comes to tech. (CS3)
The commonality among the statements above is clear: Orwell’s predictions of mass
surveillance are known to many and believed to have been proven correct. One subject
speaks about the inevitability of 1984’s totalitarian state because of contemporary subjects’
resignation to fight for their rights and privacy (recall theme about blaming the citizenry):
I am honestly amazingly surprised by the super high percentage of people here who
have zero issues giving up their rights to privacy. Yes, I know most of our
conversations are boring and if you've done nothing wrong, then who cares... but
we have a right to privacy. If we're so willing to just give up our cellphones, what's
next? Our homes, our persons? Even if you've done nothing wrong, or are boring…
this isn't right. Has no one read 1984! (CS2)
Beyond the general reference to 1984 and simply using and relating its entirety to
contemporary surveillance practices, subjects delve deeper into what Orwell refers to as
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‘Thought Police.’ These law enforcement agents are described by Simon (2005) with the
ability to “at any given moment […] [plug] in on any individual wire” to personally surveil
any subject subjugated to Big Brother. These agents “[operate] as agents of a centralized
totalitarian state which uses surveillance primarily to maintain social order and conformity”
(Haggerty & Ericson, 2000: 606), comparable to the effects of Foucault’s panopticon.
Similar capabilities are illuminated by subjects of the current study, as they compare
Thought Police to contemporary law enforcement and the alleged totalitarian state that
exists in North America by suggesting law enforcement is “[o]nly bad when [we have]
thought police instead of normal police” (RS3). Another subject echoes a similar view
about Thought Police:
Surveillance of law-abiding citizens, under the watchful eye of “Thought Police”
has the effect of putting a “chill” on freedoms of expression and assembly as
guaranteed by Canada’s Charter of Rights. It is not consistent with free and
democratic societies, but it is yet another hallmark of Police State repression.
(CS1)
However, one subject suggests the mobile technology surveillance under which
populations live is so grand and unfathomable that even Orwell himself could not have
predicted such a phenomenon:
This is just the soft sell for the hard-stuff that is lurking just around the corner in a
laboratory near you. They are developing drones the size of insects which will be
able to take out individual militants, dissidents, terrorists or just about anybody
else with sniffy armpits that Mr. Obama decides is a threat to national (or possibly
nasal) security. You couldn't make it up - even if you had George Orwell and H.G.
Wells writing the script with the help of Hitler, Stalin and Chairman Mao. (GD4)
This subject explains that surveillance subjects are aware of only some types of mobile
technology surveillance given the number of devices that have been and are currently being
created. Ultimately, these Orwellian references point to surveillance systems that are
oppressive yet inevitable without surprise.
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In addition to Orwell’s powerful book, subjects make references to popular culture
films and television shows where surveillance technologies are commonly depicted. This
is comparable to Lippert and Scalia’s (2015) exploration of video surveillance in 35
Hollywood films and the discourses that normalize surveillance within these films. As
such, subjects in the current study also analyze contemporary surveillance through films
and television shows. For example, one subject uses the television series Black Mirror to
speak to its ingenious idea of coupling “drone technology AND [government] surveillance”
(TD). The following excerpts similarly invoke films and television shows like Person of
Interest, Star Wars, The Dark Knight, and The Terminator:
[…] They have so much storage capacity they can never fill it so there's lots of room
for your travel, phone calls, texts, emails and browsing habits. […] Every move you
have made on your computer since the time you owned one is out there […] Smile,
you're on Candid Camera. […] Put some tape over your cam and pull the plug on
your tv. Make like Maxwell Smart and lower the Dome of Silence… if you should
become a person of interest you're [expletive] before you leave the house. (GS4)
Yay now Darth Bloomburg can spy on us to make sure we don't go over our allotted
serving size for soft drinks. (RD1)
I think you will find the satellites predate Terminator by more than a decade. (GD7)
America is sleep walking towards a corporate and military Skynet. (GD4)
This is basically Nolan's Batman surveillance, except instead of a highly trained
billionaire they have an underfunded group of often violent or uninterested law
enforcement and instead of crippling city-wide crime you get. (RS1)
The second excerpt above describes those who surveil in connection to the famous Star
Wars antagonist by using the word “Darth.” The latter two illustrate how subjects’ every
move is constantly watched. Epitomes of such grand and comprehensive surveillance are
both the omniscient surveillance system in Person of Interest, and The Dark Knight’s allseeing grid at the hands of Batman. Overall, these excerpts demonstrate by their allusion
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to surveillance through ‘Skynet’ and the Terminator series that surveillance is not
supported by the commenters above. As such, many commenters would be up against
surveillance.
“There’s never been a major leak of documents relating to the U.S. drone program.
Claim: NSA mass surveillance keeps us safe.” – Edward Snowden (TD)
Finally, Snowden and his leaks of NSA and other agencies’ documents regarding
surveillance programs were significantly common in the subjects’ understandings of
mobile technology surveillance. For many, Snowden was conceived as a person who
opened the eyes of the people to acknowledge and realize the mass surveillance to which
they were subject – a giver of freedom to the public.
In addition, subjects pointed to Snowden’s emphasis on what is seen by subjects to
be the true intention behind surveillance: “Edward Snowden says: Surveillance is not about
safety, surveillance is about power and control. Law enforcement is also about power and
control” (CS1, emphasis added). Interestingly, one subject who claimed he/she was from
the UK weighed in on how Snowden is viewed and spoke to the idea that the current
surveillance circumstances are beyond what Orwell foretold:
You guys think you’ve got it bad. Thanks to hero Edward Snowden, we Brits now
know that our iPhones are all controlled by our GCHQ […] who according to ES
switch on any iPhone anywhere and listen in to our conversations at home…
anywhere in fact. It’s even worse than Orwell predicted […] [a]nd of course we
Brits have no written constitution, so can’t even begin to challenge this domestic
spying scandal. This is why Edward Snowden is a hero, he has exposed more British
domestic spying crimes than anyone else in history. (GS7)
Lastly, one subject suggested “[t]his could be another Edward Snowden moment” (GD7).
Such a statement appears to treat the Snowden revelations as a watershed moment as others
have mentioned above. From a different perspective, it is worth speculating whether the
Snowden revelations brought change to subjects’ understandings of surveillance. In his

49
review of Lyon’s Surveillance After Snowden (2015), Specht (2017: 1) notes Lyon’s
message that “Snowden’s words did not constitute a moment of actual change in how
surveillance is being undertaken.” It is worth exploring whether the transition from pre- to
post-Snowden surveillance is associated with subjects’ understandings of surveillance
post-Snowden.8 The current study shows that some subjects see Snowden’s ‘moment’ as
an existential transition, whereas others are surprised at those who are unaware of this
moment: “I was at a holiday gathering and was astonished how many people either did not
know or were misinformed about the Snowden revelations” (GD4).
1.6 Crime and Conditionals
For many communities, public surveillance not only has the benefit of deterring
crime and aiding in the apprehension of criminals. It can also function to monitor
the police, reduce racial profiling, curb police brutality, and ultimately increase
perceptions of legitimacy (Capers, 2012: 959).
Another common theme discovered involved crime and its combination with
conditionals. First, subjects proposed different points of view concerning surveillance and
crime, including the assessment of who uses the mobile technologies for surveillance and
for what purpose. Some saw the positivity in mobile technology surveillance for detecting
crime. Such subjects advocate for anybody’s use of the device – such as law enforcement
agents – to help locate criminal activity:
On the other hand, with the crime rate in Northern Alberta skyrocketing (especially
with child pornography and sex labour) and the amount of fentanyl and W18 being
imported and sold in Edmonton alone, maybe something like a Stingray isn't a bad
tool. (RS7)

To explore whether this was such a significant moment in subjects’ experiences of
surveillance, one must compare discourses on surveillance pre- and post-Snowden. Such
an examination is out of the scope of the current study given that the pre-Snowden era was
not examined but can and should be undertaken in future research.
8
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Police have been using drones for years. I seem to remember a spike in drug busts
at a music festival a few years ago which was attributed to drone surveillance good to know they save them for the heavy crimes and don't just indulge in
persecution and intimidation. (GD1)
The general public must understand and appreciate the reality of how difficult it is
to nail these miscreants without the use of these tools, and coloring outside the
lines. Personally, I am more than happy to assist in any way I can to nail would-be
terrorists and other such criminals. (CS1)
They contract with Google and its mapping van! :-) There's a Stingray in every one
of those vans and the NSA has powerful super-computers with sophisticated
algorithms that identify the crime-related phrases in the resulting terabytes of
conversational data! (GS1)
These statements discern subjects to be before surveillance while partially showing an
indifference to whether mobile technology surveillance is beneficial. The subjects convey
an acceptance of surveillance for greater, utilitarian purposes and see the surveillance
system as useful. Contrary to more positive expositions towards mobile technology
surveillance to alleviate societies of certain crimes, other subjects had more negative
feedback to offer regarding such surveillance concerning crime:
Why are they needed? They are not going to stop crime. If it takes the job of patrols,
that's not very positive in our economic state. If it doesn't take the job of patrols, it
seems expensively redundant. It's unknown if they're even effective as a law
enforcement tool. Because it's going to be a public nuisance and the possibility for
abuse, the problems outweigh the necessity as a law enforcement tool. (RD1)
It is part of the complete surveillance of every single human being for reasons
having nothing to do with terrorism or crime. (GD2)
It's called stalking when you listen in on someone's conversation. It doesn't matter
who you work for. If you do this without legal cause you are a criminal. That goes
for the good guys as well. Knowing is half the battle. […] These folks who do this,
they don't care about your life or your rights. […] They're paranoid. Your need to
listen in is an illness. The moment texting was invented the Government used it to
prevent us from communicating while operating a vehicle. […] They are paranoid,
they are afraid of normal people everywhere, and that technology helped create
their fears. (CS5)
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The final excerpt above refers to any person who uses such tactics, regardless of their
occupation, as one who defies the law. This subject posits that anyone who surveils
illegally is a criminal, leaning towards being situated against surveillance. Beyond the use
of mobile technology surveillance as a pre-emptive tool, other subjects referred to
“criminals using drones [and Stingrays] as counter-surveillance” (TD) and the fear of
criminals getting their hands on certain devices:
Another great reason for not carrying a cell phone. If the police are stealing your
data, then the criminals, and other government agencies, are doing it too. (CS1)
In the 80's, Motorola had an ad claiming the biggest consumer of radio surveillance
equipment in the US was organized crime. Everyone knew what a scanner was…
Organized crime syndicates today probably monitor more than the police do,
especially with all the high-tech gadgetry out there and having computers doing all
the scanning automatically. Other side of the coin is the fact that organized crime
doesn't follow the law but police have to. (CS1)
Second, with many comments about crime and surveillance came conditionals in
the logical-philosophical sense of the word. As indicated by Bennett (2004: 96), a
conditional simply means a statement following the logic of “if… then.” Accordingly,
many subjects express their sentiments through conditional language, suggesting that if
certain processes are met – such as legal and/or administrative ones – then these
surveillance tools and devices are certainly useful for keeping criminals off the streets. The
following excerpts delineate similar conditionals:
Admitting to having it, and considering the RCMP having it, there are obviously
critical cases where it's use has been justified. My guess is that it was used in the
massing child porn ring bust a couple years back. While I still see and understand
the issues with this device, that's one scenario that I can agree with its use. […]
Bottom line, as long as there is a clear structure of having to go through various
levels of management, and various levels of risk need to be met, along with
warrants with extremely specific scopes of use, and information gleaned that is not
within the specific scope of use is discarded immediately, I think I'm fine with it,
[…] (RS7, emphasis added)
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Who cares it's helping find CRIMINALS more prisons more work for the peoples of
the north forget mining in the artic build super maxes prisons for rent to the world
we can take all the Guantanamo Bay inmates when it closes all the big stars in
American prisons this will be huge for Canadians and the economy and hope for
the future! (CS6)
Homeland security had a grant program that police departments could apply for to
use this device for terrorist operations/surveillance. The LAPD got one and
apparently used it for just about everything and anything. I think they're useful in
dire situations (amber alerts, active shooters, actual terrorist issues) but I think for
any old thing that it's just not warranted. I would say that every time it's used, an
investigation is done into why, kind of like with ASIRT. (RS7)
No problem whatsoever with the Stingray. - if EPS provides all documented
evidence and public videos of all officers conduct without FOIP requests. (RS7)
Many of these excerpts befit the three narratives and show surveillance at one point to be
acceptable for certain purposes, but at other times oppressive or useful for one’s advantage
in some way. One conversation between two subjects features two sides to an argument
concerning whether mobile technology surveillance is justified. The conversation between
the two subjects (S1 and S2) concludes with S1 suggesting that such surveillance by law
enforcement is permissible since criminals are tracked:
S1: Thanks for the good police work. Keep it up.
S2: Are you against all freedom and civil liberties, or just the ones you don't
value?
S1: I'm against the criminals. What is wrong with that?
S2: You're supporting government spying on innocent civilians.
S1: The police are using the device to track and investigate criminal activities not
innocent civilians. (CS2)
1.7 Law and Privacy: Ownership-based and Reductionist Interpretations
Finally, one of the most common discursive topics with which subjects were
concerned involved some sort of privacy or legal matter. First, subjects see the law as
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something that has been ultimately suspended. If not to this extreme, subjects also show
their belief of an existing “gap” in, or several violations of, the law. That is, these subjects
see statutes and the Constitution in their respective North American nations to have been
breached by mobile technology surveillance:
Elsewhere it is reported that purchasers of the Stingray are required to sign a
document that prevents them from revealing the purchase. Wouldn't this
requirement be a violation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms? (CS1)
Is there any privacy left for Canadians after Bill-C51 except for the privacy
afforded those who stash their loot offshore? (CS6)
[S]ome sort of lawsuit should be brought to federal court, based on the breach of
the US Constitution. […] This is an institution that was supposed to be the defender
of the Constitution. It is now slowly slipping into a reproduction of the worst forms
of secret police in tyrannical states. (GD2)
Ugh. Taking one Amendment away from us at a time. (RD2)
One noteworthy dialogue between subjects involved a Supreme Court’s interpretation of
the Constitution concerning an issue of surveillance:
S1: [B]ut by this question, are you assuming that the Supreme Court always
interprets the Constitution correctly?
S2: ... well in a technical sense, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Constitution is the 'correct' one, since they have the last word in interpreting it. So
when the SCotUS says that separate but equal is acceptable, that’s the
interpretation they use. My question to you is: Is there a 'correct' way to interpret
the Constitution? And if so, what is it?
S1: If you assume there is a 'correct' way to interpret the Constitution, you're going
to clash with someone else's 'correct' way of interpreting it. Which is precisely what
happens on the bench of the Supreme Court anyway. I don't see any 'correct' way
to interpret the Constitution, but I would always say it’s better to interpret to better
protect life, liberty, and property. Any interpretation that runs against life, liberty,
or property would need some serious justification for me to accept it. (RD4)
This important dialogue portrays one subject admitting that there is no “correct” way to
interpret the Constitution as shown by several court cases. Ironically, the subject proceeds
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to offer what the subject understands as an ideal framework under which an interpretation
of the Constitution should operate.
Among other things, subjects also suggest that law’s effect on such surveillance is
minimal given their belief that they are “not sure it’s going to make much of a difference”
(RS2). Other sentiments involved jokes about the law, also suggesting its limited
applicability: “Passing a law to prevent warrantless spying? Why didn't we think of that
300 years ago?” (RS2). Here, subjects assumingly see law as ineffective and note its
struggles to keep up with technological advances (see Wadhwa, 2014 regarding law
keeping up with technology). This categorizes such subjective understandings as being up
against surveillance, also coinciding with the humor behind the sentiment. As such, some
subjects offer their ideas concerning the type of laws and/or regulations needed for mobile
technology surveillance. The first excerpt demonstrates a subjective belief that resistance
is unnecessary but justified through law:
We need a law that requires a license prior to a drone flight and insurance […] in
case the thing crashes and hurts someone. […] In certain situations like firefighting
or inspecting mountains for data on avalanches, they may be of use. […] Just like
planes you should need permission and prior flight path prior to takeoff. […]
Shooting them down is ridiculous. If you shoot a gun in the air […] that bullet will
come down somewhere and […] you'll get charged. (CD2)
Another subject echoes this sentiment:
So, have "terrorists" figured out, yet, that they can use drones to fly their "nextgeneration suicide bombs" a few miles to a desired target area? Yes,
unfortunately. Is that a good enough reason to have lots or "regulations"
monitoring/regulating this new product? Yes. Unfortunate but necessary. (CD2)
Despite some negative views exhibited towards the law, some subjects come to the
Constitution’s defense:
Re-read section 1 of the Charter. Right or wrong, things like this have passed the
Oakes Test and have been interpreted as a reasonable infringement on your
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fundamental rights. I'm not coming out on one side or the other, just answering
your question. (RS7)
Others positively react to certain devices and propose that only minor changes are needed:
My husband builds FPV drones in the US. I think the only regulating that should
be done is that pilots should have licenses to fly them. Not register each one.
Because it's important people know how to fly them safely and without disturbing
others. (CD2)
Second, an important theme pertinent to surveillance consciousness involves
privacy. Privacy issues were expressed in ways seemingly aligning with Floridi’s (2014)
characterization of two perspectives on privacy, namely the reductionist and the
ownership-based interpretations, which also befit Ewick and Silbey’s three schemas.
Floridi (2014: 116) defines the reductionist interpretation as follows:
[T]he value of privacy rests on a variety of undesirable consequences that may be
caused by its breach, either personally, such as distress, or socially, such as
unfairness. Privacy is a utility, also in the sense of providing an essential condition
of possibility of good human interactions, by preserving human dignity or by
guaranteeing political checks and balances, for example.
Here, the reductionist approach coincides with not only being up against surveillance due
to the notion of feeling a sense of unfairness or “making do” with situations as shown
below, but also characterizes an engagement with surveillance, where privacy is a personal
utility expected not to be breached. These interpretations of privacy for the current study
tended to be more political as part of the reductionist approach. The comments below
illustrate such depictions. They most importantly focus on the consequences of privacy
being breached as a political check. These comments do not necessarily refer to the term
“privacy” but in some cases substitute it for “(civil) liberty.”
What kind of [expletive] response is that? "Get used to it" ... as if they don't even
entertain the idea of civil liberties anymore and he can't be bothered to put on a
dog and pony show about it. (RD1)
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This is called a house and another reason why most walls aren't see-through. Most
people don't live in glass houses because of this. Also, a reason for having fencing
is to create privacy; this is exactly why they are called "privacy fences.” (RD4)
The erosion of our basic civil liberties is too high a price for to pay for the sake of
whatever benefits this technology offers by way of enforcement. What alarms me as
much as their use of it was their lying about it at the outset. This does not engender
much in the way of trust. (CS2)
...and now the IRS employs dubious authorities to also carry out their own prolific
privacy violations on Americans. The government simply goes out-of-control when
not held to account under the shield of secrecy. (GS2)
The continual drip of information that colours in more-and-more just how much
disregard the U. S. Government has when it comes to guarding and honoring the
people’s privacy. Huge privacy violations permeate throughout multiple
government agencies. (GS8)
Conversely, the ownership-based interpretation moves away from the intangible notions of
privacy and
argues that informational privacy needs to be respected because of each person’s
rights to bodily security and property, where ‘property of x’ is classically
understood as the right to exclusive use of x. A person is said to own his or her
information (information about him-or herself) […] and therefore to be entitled to
control its whole life cycle, from generation to erasure through usage (Floridi, 2014:
116, emphasis original).
The ownership-based interpretation moves strictly toward subjects’ understandings
engaging with surveillance given the emphasis on one’s own x, whatever that may be,
ultimately protecting one’s own interest. The final comment below also partially
exemplifies being up against surveillance. As such, the following excerpts show how
privacy is seen as one’s own x where subjects are seen to defend the idea that whatever x
is, is particularly theirs and nobody else’s x:
[T]he towns and cities are installing new types of transmission receivers onto
existing power sources already in place. Everywhere one drives in our locale, the
power companies are present, installing new "hardware" […] for placement of
what many have identified as surveillance devices. As a beach resort, and
surrounding high volume tourist resorts […] of university students […] the policing
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of the coastal towns is very tight and secure. But, at the cost of citizens' personal
privacy. I think the price is too much […] (GS4, emphasis added)
Read my lips: "Privacy is dead." The advent of the Canadian Security
Establishment and the NSA, etc. etc. etc. has eliminated privacy. Get over it folks.
Your life is an open book. (CS5, emphasis added)
I'm not the least concerned about videos *of* them I'm more worried about videos
*from* them. What I do on my property is absolutely nobody's business but my own.
(CD2, emphasis added)
The powers that be who write regulations on these things should place Privacy as
the top rule. If I see a drone hovering within my property limits within five seconds
it will receive a blast a double-barreled blast from my 12 gauge shotgun; the owner,
if he can find the pieces, will never be able to put it back together. (CD2, emphasis
added)
As we can see, these two interpretations of privacy as put forth by Floridi display a very
similar perception of privacy that subjects have exhibited throughout this examination of
surveillance consciousness. However, this is not to insinuate there were not any positive,
more accepting interpretations of privacy where subjects’ understandings were ultimately
situated before surveillance as shown below with one subject referring to a “formallyordered, rational” (Ewick & Silbey, 1998: 47) system. This subject suggests that
surveillance conducted by different agencies is not necessarily illegal as some may
mistakenly understand the situation:
This report assumes all of this was done illegally...where is the proof? ....'Currently,
there is no public information about how agencies like the RCMP, CSIS and police
forces use these devices.' ...then why assume. Any court case whereby illegal info was
obtained will be thrown out ... not sure this privacy issue is as big as it is being painted.
Sure makes people talk and read articles...that maybe the only good outcome here...
(CS5)

2. Situated With, Before, and Against Surveillance
To reiterate, one of the sub-questions that this thesis sought to answer was: “How and to
what extent do Ewick and Silbey’s three narratives encapsulate subjective understandings
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of mobile technology surveillance?” Surveillance consciousness was discovered to be
mostly understood through Ewick and Silbey’s narratives. The following explicates how
subjects are seen stationed further and directly within the three realms of surveillance
consciousness consistent with Ewick and Silbey’s narratives. This is demonstrated through
various excerpts that delineate surveillance consciousness being captured directly through
these schemas.
To repeat, being with surveillance involves subjects using surveillance to achieve
their own personal ends – despite any barriers – or identifying such a desire in others. In
other words, subjects with surveillance illuminate different agencies and law enforcement’s
use of surveillance to fulfill their own official, organizational interests and gain certain
advantages. These interests are pursued by “[displaying] less concern about the legitimacy
… [or other] procedures than about their effectiveness for achieving desires” (Ewick &
Silbey, 1998: 48). The following comments given by subjects illustrate such agency uses
of surveillance:
Cellphones are not very trustworthy. So "evidence" about and around cellphones
is not very reliable. And the Five Eyes agencies working around these issues are
difficult if not impossible to know. That said, any "evidence" we see could change
in an NSA minute. Or is that a New York minute? (CS4, emphasis added)
The police are going about this all wrong, as usual. If they want this information,
they should do it the legal way. […] Spend some money and get developers to invent
an addictive game or other mobile app that becomes a craze, and offer it for free.
Then, when people download the app, make sure the small print states that, if you
accept the terms of the agreement, you are allowing the police to monitor your
phones and use the information gathered against you if you are in any way
suspected of committing a crime. […] Everyone will accept the terms […] and the
police can then do what they want because you've given them your
permission. (CS5)
Sounds like a lot of police departments are willing to make a deal with the devil to
get their hands on the shiny new toy. The potential for misuse here is huge. What if
one of the detectives was uneasy about a girlfriend or wife? Just drive by her house
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and fire it up. Now they'll try the Nuremberg defense of "just following orders" to
attempt to avoid perjury charges. (GS1)
Yeah but now they have a provision for "emergency situations" that get to be
defined by whoever is in charge that day. (RS2)
It is important to note the consistency between the excerpts above and Ewick and Silbey’s
(1998: 131) with the law description as subjects understanding “legality as available to
others as well […,] both official and lay participants.” Here, subjects acknowledge the
power of officials and its ability to “substantially increase the likelihood of skewing the
outcome and fixing the game” (1998: 145). The first excerpt above refers to the subject’s
understanding of NSA surveillance operations as those that implicate surveillance being
used for benefitting the NSA, as they alter or erase evidence when subjects seek it for their
own personal advantage. The quotation immediately following actually proposes certain
ways the police can properly surveil the public despite the deceptive undertone such a task
would carry; this provides a way for police to use mobile technology surveillance for their
own interests. Like the first, the third excerpt makes reference to the NSA and other
agencies but implies that the ambivalence of populations has been taken advantage of to
pursue further surveillance. The fourth comment shows the subject pointing to the
possibility of questionable practices by users of mobile technology surveillance such as
“detectives” using such surveillance to spy on their partners; their actions are said to be
justified by the users themselves as they seek their own personal ends.
Other comments that show subjects to be with surveillance also involve subjects
using mobile technology surveillance for personal gain. These subjects either seek their
personal ends or also put forward the idea of the devices being made available to the public
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for others to meet their own ends. The following examples are illustrative of such uses of
surveillance:
I want one. (GS5)
I'd wanna replace my $19 mock surveillance drone with an actual drone. Instead
of flying coach, own the airline. (TS)
Get me one of these toys and I'll give you guys a hand lol. (GS7)
Not so far, but I should send a drone there for surveillance just to make sure.
(TS)
I need to buy a Stingray for my girlfriend. (RS1)
These Stingrays should be available at your local store. (CS2)
One subject expresses the proposition that mobile technology surveillance’s use can vary
depending on the persons using it and how they end up using it for their own intended
purposes:
As far as I can see, this technology is greatly depended on who uses it and for what
purposes. I have problems with unauthorized drones around airports, harbours,
industrial sites… The kid that uses it to spy on neighbors, well that’s a privacy
matter and could be a police call. (CD1)
Here, the subject acknowledges the ability of others to use the technology for their own
personal interests.
The second narrative, being before surveillance, shows many understand
surveillance “in its own awesome grandeur […] defined by its impartiality” (Ewick &
Silbey, 1998: 46). The sphere of surveillance is one that is external to individuals and goes
far beyond any one individual’s existence, unaffected by time. As such, subjects here have
more of a positive yet defenseless understanding about surveillance – one that presumes
the intention of surveillance or those who surveil to be propitious. In combination with
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these subjects, others can also be before surveillance even if they simply speak of
surveillance’s magnificence alone.
The following examples display how subjects perceive surveillance to be an
acceptable and brilliant phenomenon; some of these excerpts discern surveillance to be
permissible for the safety of their nation:
Drones are great for surveillance, cheap to run, can stay in the air for a day. (CD3)
This is an excellent tool to be used for monitoring our coastlines and the far north.
Drones will save lives and costs carrying out these missions. If push comes to shove
drones with the capability to "shoot back" are absolutely necessary. The modern
battlefield demands technology on this level. (CD3)
[…] Using this technology is a good thing to keep Canada safe. (CS3)
Please continue to use them. Listen to everything. […] This is about […] ensuring
the safety (and freedom) we as Canadians enjoy. The playing field is not a level one
so please let's allow those charged with protecting us the tools to do so. And let's
stop getting in their way. […] Law enforcement does indeed abide by rules too. […]
If we did, we wouldn't be making this an issue or conversation. Allow them to see
and hear behind the curtain... And we increase the probability of being able to
delay/stop evil plots. Ask them to slow down and be transparent will eventually
result in tragedy. #openyoureyes. (CS6)
I had the luck to talk to a two-star air force general, he stated that in Iraq, […]
combined intelligence agencies have used the drone system to create a persistent
map of Iraq, so if an IED [improvised explosive device] goes off they can rewind
said map and find out where the insurgence came from. If this were implemented
in the USA the government would be able to track any citizen at any time. […]
[T]his system is passive and would monitor everyone, and would be relatively
inexpensive to maintain. (RD8)
[…] My reaction would be that it sounds like a good thing. I don't understand why
you ask the question. Do you think it would be a bad thing? (GS6)
These comments above illustrate subjects’ perceived notions that surveillance is in fact a
constructive tactic used to assist populations rather than harm them. In other words, the
lives of others could be saved via the important surveillance carried out by governmental
agencies as shown clearly in the second, third and fourth excerpts. Others also stress the
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cost of maintaining such devices to be relatively cheap and attainable, thus providing
justification for using mobile technology surveillance.
Even further, many subjects referred to surveillance as a phenomenon so grand that
subjects themselves are utterly defenseless towards the system. Not only do they see this
authoritative ‘entity’ as one to which they are exposed, but also one that transcends their
individual selves and is external to one’s finite being and existence: 9
This means exactly nothing. You will feel better about what's allowed while what's
really going on will still keep happening. Welcome to the surveillance state. (RS2)
When it really comes down to it, there is nothing that can keep you truly anonymous
while communicating online. If you become valued highly by the authorities, they
have millions of times more resources at their disposal to find you than you have to
stay hidden from them. (RS6)
To think that Canada doesn't have an obligation to have a meaningful contribution
to security in the western world is to completely ignore our historical contribution
and to have contempt for the men and women who have for over 200 years fought
and paid the ultimate price for our freedom. (CD3)
Good luck with that, they are everywhere from construction firms to film sets. You
can buy them for less than $1000 with full 1080 video included, have fun rounding
all those up. (RD8)
The first comment understands surveillance as something that is immovable and powerful
beyond measure. The second echoes this sentiment by referencing the tools “at their
disposal” that are far beyond what subjects could imagine. This is like the defenseless
portrayal of subjects to mobile technology surveillance in the fourth comment. Comment
number three describes the temporal transcendence of mobile technology surveillance as
an obligation to honour those who have fought for freedom of their nation’s people.

9

The notion of transcendence is further elaborated later in this chapter.
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Lastly, it is worth noting surveillance consciousness’ similarity to legal
consciousness vis-à-vis the notion that those who are before the law do not worry about
legal procedure and merely accept it regardless of the consequences. Equivalently, this idea
permeates through subjects’ surveillance consciousness:
Who cares its helping find CRIMINALS more prisons more work for the peoples of
the north, forget mining in the artic build super maxes prisons for rent to the world
we can take all the Guantanamo Bay inmates when it closes all the big stars in
American prisons this will be huge for Canadians and the economy and hope for
the future! (CS6)
Here's the deal. You can't demand adherence to the Constitution just some of the
time. Americans apparently do not want the freedom guaranteed by the constitution
if that also means reliance on personal responsibility vice the supposed security
provided by the Leviathan. (GS4)
You live with cynicism. I live with optimism. Maybe the prosecutors sign those
agreements because how someone was caught is irrelevant to proving in court that
they are guilty. (GS8)
[D]id it say in there that it was without a warrant? Did I miss that? So what if they
had the ability to listen to people who weren’t involved in the warrant. There is no
proof that they did so. It’s no different than if you share an apartment with someone
and the police obtain a warrant to search their room... they have the ability to
search your room while they are in there...but that doesn’t mean they did. In fact
it’s unlikely that they did so without a warrant because they really don’t care about
you and don’t want to jeopardize their case. (CS6)
The final excerpt above is an evident example of warrants essentially being unlimited
passes that governmental agencies and law enforcement could use for their intended
purposes. In short, such subjects who stand before surveillance and disregard legal
procedure would permit any use of anti-terrorism legislation or policy that would ensure
the protection of populations, regardless of whether such decrees were put into place
legally.
The third and final narrative taken from Ewick and Silbey’s (1998) explication of
legal consciousness involves subjects up against surveillance. Here, surveillance is an
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oppressive entity that can and should be resisted, regardless of whether subjects are
successful in doing so (Lettre, 2008). The mere expression of an idea of how to resist
surveillance could be subjects standing up against surveillance. Initially, many subjects
were identified to be questioning whether or when mobile technology surveillance was
going to be resisted by individuals:
Hm, wonder if there's technology out there yet for drone sensors and something to
kaibosh their function. As it is now, if one finds a drone hovering over their private
property, etc., what to do? Throw rocks at it? (CD2)
When will the people of the USA stand up and revolt?? It's been time... (GS7)
Surely there's a device to detect the device being used to detect the IMSI device?
(CS4)
These subjects direct our attention to their underlying assumption that such surveillance
has not yet been resisted effectively, thus leaving the surveillance system in control and
power. However, other subjects have, instead of questioning who or what will resist
surveillance, recommended different ways through which surveillance can be combatted
even slightly:
This is why people need to use iMessage over SMS, encrypt emails, and use App
calling like FaceTime for privacy. (CS1)
Protect yourself and get encryption software on your phones! This technology can
easily be abused by agenda based, corrupt cops that bribe their judge with a bag
of pure cocaine. In other words everyone has a price. (CS3)
If you don't want an eye in the sky to spy on you using the bathroom, start closing
the window shade. (GD4)
If this concerns you, get an encrypted messaging app. Signal is my choice. (RS7)
If you guys are wondering how to detect if you're connected to a fake tower just
download AIMSICD on android (needs root). (RS7)

65
One subject refers to a defense attorney who suggests how to “challenge Stingray cell
surveillance” (TS), and the subject attaches a picture to the post referring to the attorney’s
guide for other attorneys to use when standing against the Stingray in court. Another
subject offers a thorough and technological explanation and guideline for others to resist.
Here, we find a subject describing the networking complexities of Stingrays and their
upgrade called “hailstorms”:
[T]his is why I use things like WhatsApp now to figure out encrypted voice. Okay
so looking into this apparently Stingray devices only function on 2G/GSM. So
everyone's "[drug dealer]" could just enter *#*#4636#*#* into their android, then
set to LTE/WCDMA as the preferred network type. […] There is a stringray
upgrade called "hailstorm" which connects via the 4G bands but the cost would
pretty much guarantee EPS not hiring anyone for a long time. It would be difficult
to hide. If that's the case, then something like a silent-pocket phone protector would
be a viable option + encryption on everything. (RS7)
Further resistance is shown not necessarily by those who may have resisted by their own
accord, but also subjects who applaud and justify those who do resist or have thought of
ways to accomplish such resistance. For example, some subjects expressed their
satisfaction with others’ attempts to resist:
Since many American citizens are so precious towards their rights under the
constitution, most notably the right to bear arms in a rearguard against government
encroachment, I would for once like to applaud their steadfast refusal to give up
their glocks in the face of all logical arguments, and thoroughly encourage them to
point them at the heavens and bring this blatant violation of privacy to a swift and
explosive conclusion... (GD4)
People keep using drones for creepy surveillance—and one guy finally had his
drone shot down. (TD)
And you wonder why people use telegram and other encrypted chat programs.
(RS1)
Finally, subjects also tended to refer to their own experiences of being surveilled
and/or resisting surveillance. Some referred to a hypothetical situation they could witness
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and the steps they would take to oppose and resist mobile technology surveillance in
different ways. The following excerpts offer some examples of both experiences:
Imagine fitting your drone with a camera or infra-red vision and being able to
snoop on your neighbours or on the US neighbours. Imagine arming them with little
bombs and dropping them on your neighbour's pet or backyard - image all the fun
that will cause. If I see one near my house - it gets shot down. (CD1)
Clearly, drones should be illegal --- if one flew above my house, I would figure out
a way to take it out. (CD2)
My cell phone will be turned off before I come within two kilometers of Vancouver
from now on. (CS1)
So, the way to combat this is to learn to bore the living crap out of everyone with
whom you speak on the cell. Example: "Hello?" "Yes, hello, Dana, it's me, Bill."
"Yes, I know who it is, I'm married to you." "Well, I'm calling to ask how your day
is and if you want me to pick up anything at the store and also, how is your mum?"
[…] Click. Remember, you fight this Stingray stuff with pure banality. Happy
boring! (GS7)
Years ago I discovered a tap on my home phone. […] Every night we put four hours
of mindless chatter on some recording. Finally my boss had to let me know he knew
what we had been talking about the night before. I found out later the insurance
industry was aiding a federal investigation into loopholes in maritime law. […]
Since then I have been careful what I say on the phone, no information about ATM
codes or bank accounts is discussed. And I suggest that those of you who are
reading this do the same. (GS8)
As we can see, some commenters refer to opposing surveillance “with pure banality,” and
others briefly resist surveillance by being “careful” about what they say when
communicating with others via telephone or other modes of communication. As a
supplement to such experiences, some did not necessarily refer to how they resisted
surveillance but rather provide their view of the surveillance system as oppressive:
Right after I started a group called "Stop Harper" on Facebook in 2012, with
nothing illegal about it, my MacBook and iPhone were hacked the next day. Apple
still has no idea how it happened and for 3 years later, I continued getting hacked
that left no trail behind. And gee, I wonder who was responsible for that? (CS3)
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So much for the constitution and the rule of law. Our government now spies on us
and keeps secrets against its citizens. […] It is now not only our right but our duty
to dismantle this rogue regime, according to the Declaration of Independence. […]
I now consider this country void and illegal and a fascist state of authoritarians
that have over thrown the True America. America has lost her moral righteousness
and any resemblance to what my ancestors built. We have been overthrown by the
corporate elite and their law enforcement cronies. (GS1)

3. The State of Exception and Temporality of Surveillance Consciousness
The following commonly referenced themes were discerned to be the most prevalent
among the “other” category to which excerpts were categorized if they did not seemingly
fall into the scope of being with, before, or against surveillance. However, excerpts could
have been coded as one or more of these schemas in addition to the “other” category. This
section outlines two such discourses: first, subjects’ agreement with the notion underlying
Agamben’s (2005) State of Exception, overlapping with before and against surveillance;
and second, the temporal aspect of surveillance consciousness where subjects are
visionaries, overlapping with before. It is important to note that upon further analysis of
these two common themes highlighted below, their consistency with Ewick and Silbey’s
three narratives became more prevalent and ultimately abolished their initially said
deviation from the three original schemas.
3.1 Agamben’s State of Exception
[…] [I]ncreasingly surveillance has been normalised, it is ubiquitous, and its gaze
extends to all. Surveillance is an embedded, commonplace facet of everyday life in
ways that were unimaginable 50 years ago and its technologies are dispersed
through our social world. Surveillance technologies that were once the province of
experts within elite state institutions, like intelligence bureaux and counterespionage agencies, have been democratised and are now readily available for
purchase by ordinary personal consumers (Zedner, 2008: 58).
As subjects express their sentiments towards mobile technology surveillance as
something normalized in social life and away from which subjects cannot turn at this point,
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we can refer to Agamben’s (2005) explication of the state of exception. In his work,
Agamben provides a genealogical account of what he calls the state of exception (otherwise
known as a state of emergency). Agamben sets out to theorize the exceptional state and its
immovable stature that it has reached (Humphreys, 2006). Rather than follow general
accounts of the exceptional state which theorize it as one that is extra-juridical, Agamben
argues that “the state of exception is neither internal nor external to the juridical order, and
the problem of defining it concerns precisely a threshold, or a zone of indifference, where
inside and outside do not exclude each other but rather blur with one another” (2006: 679).
For Agamben, the state of exception has become a normal paradigm of government (see
Agamben, 2005: 1-31) or “near ubiquitous” (Humphreys, 2006: 677). Here, the exception
of the state is conventional and becomes an adamant guideline or imperative to follow
(Douglas, 2009).
Indeed, there is much overlap between this theme and being before surveillance.
Subjects situated before surveillance refer to surveillance’s almost inevitable normalization
in society but struggle with it due to their powerlessness. For the current study, subjects
constantly suggest that surveillance has become common for populations in Canada the
US. For example, one subject posts a picture while the subject’s comment refers to the
picture of a drone Lego toy as a way for “the next generation” to experience the
“[n]ormalization of drone surveillance” (TD). We can also refer back to the picture
mentioned by one commenter above about Stingrays being “the most common surveillance
tool” (TS). Other subjects provide further illustrations of normalization by listing what type
of information is monitored and other ways normalization occurs:
[…] The government has been spying on us ever since the second World War and
it has become more and more prevalent, encompassing, and secretive. They have
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access to our computers, our phones, TV's, our banking and travel details, most
new cars have GPS trackers built into them from manufacturers, and the list goes
on and on in ways you couldn't even imagine. (CS3)
[…] I was born and grew up here in the U.S. I can tell you without a doubt that
there are countless things wrong and that there is a sinister plan, if you will. Any
government that desires complete surveillance and total control of the people is
NOT a democratic government, period. […] This will not just affect Americans, but
everyone around the world. Remember this. Hitler did not just desire to conquer a
couple of countries, he wanted the whole enchilada, so to speak. (GS8)
According to a retired cop I talked to over 10 years ago, they were using them for
years at that point. (RS4)
This story about the police surveillance overhead is hardly nothing new because it
has been going on for years. (GD5)
When I read the title, it upset me to think that there were 2,000 such cases
nationwide. Then I read that this was only in Baltimore. Makes me think that there's
essentially a grid of these devices that are active in all districts at all times. There
is no way that this issue is limited to only Baltimore. It's gotta be way bigger. (RS1)
It’s fairly common knowledge amongst those who have been watching that DARPA
[Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency] has been working on drone swarms
for a decade or so now. (GD7)
The theme in the comments above is that surveillance can be and has become common in
different ways, including many subjects simply being knowledgeable about a certain
device for years as explicitly shown in fourth and fifth comments. However, such normality
lends credence to subjects’ understandings being up against surveillance. Being up against
surveillance can invoke a frequently overlooked feature of being resistant, which “is that it
often involves making do with what a situation offers” (see Ewick & Silbey, 1998: 185);
the excerpts above display such a feature. In addition, some earlier comments about the
“nothing to hide” argument also convey the normality of surveillance, but here showing an
engagement with surveillance for the purpose of simply focusing on and worrying about
oneself throughout this ubiquitous surveillance:
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We’re at the point now where a reasonable expectation of privacy is pretty much a
myth. Most of us take care of the details with social networking anyway. Dance like
no one is watching and don’t sweat it. (RD5, emphasis added)
The other side to this schema’s relation to the state of exception is that which infers
each member of the population to be “suspicious.” It is important to note that Agamben’s
(2005) state of exception emphasizes the exclusion of particular groups of individuals;
however, the current study uses the state of exception as more of a generalizing
phenomenon (see Ericson, 2007). For the duration of the state of exception, all individuals
are seen by the state as suspect. As a product of what appears as a utilitarian ideology,
every person’s rights and freedoms are sacrificed to preserve the state’s power and protect
its people (see Agamben, 2005). In other words, the presumption of innocence becomes an
overruled principle whereby it is superseded by the portrayal of the given population to be
entirely suspect (2005). In this case, laws are ultimately eliminated and those who were
once subject to various laws become subject to one exceptional law. Here, the force of law
is paradoxically illuminated in the absence of law (Agamben, 2005; Coleman, 2007). As
described by Bhuta (2003: 203), this is a state “where law applies by not applying.”
Primarily, a state of exception should only occur (temporarily) during a time of emergency
wherein a nation’s life is threatened (Humphreys, 2006; Douglas, 2009). As it gradually
remains in place, it becomes accepted, breaches its temporalities (Agamben, 2005), and it
removes itself from the context of war and shifts to an immutable force “during peacetime”
(Humphreys, 2006: 679).
This transgression noted above, which allows the state of exception to remain intact
beyond its primarily temporary intention, directs subjects to feel as if they are always,
endlessly suspects. For the current study, this is commonly shown by subjects who
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understand themselves and others as suspects by those who surveil, echoing an Agambian
view:
And what if the authorities THINK you are a criminal just because they have
monitored you and do not like or agree with some aspect of your life? Your
acceptance of this is frankly dangerous because it is the kind of behaviour and lax
acceptance of judicial overreaching that condones and enables dictatorial
behaviour from the latter, and can even lead to dictatorships. (CS5)
You're not a citizen, you're a suspect. (GS2)
[…] Also suspicion has the quality of considering anyone and all who could be
suspected of crime due to some circumstance that would arouse suspicion,
however, the suspicion was unfounded. (CS1)
"Attention: Suspect Fred Smith is in the Paint section at Home Hardware". Not
only would this not grossly invade the privacy of non-suspects, it would provide
better and more specific information, eliminating the need of these Stingray devices
outright. (CS3)
Haven't you heard? Copies of the Constitution could turn you into a terrorist
suspect. (GS2)
Evidently, these excerpts reveal the inevitability of becoming suspects to those who surveil,
regardless of whether one’s actions warrant one being targeted. It is important to note that
here, subjective understandings were discerned to be up against surveillance due to their
display of another feature of resistance – one that “entails a consciousness of being less
powerful in a relationship of power […] thus [implying] a particular understanding or
positioning of self and other, of being up against something or someone” (Ewick & Silbey,
1998: 183). However, in addition to being up against surveillance these subjective
understandings can also be being before surveillance, where some subjects refer to its
impartiality but also “express frustration, even anger, about what they perceive as their own
powerlessness” (1998: 47).
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3.2 Temporality and Surveillance Consciousness
Oh Christmas drone, Oh Christmas drone, Your surveillance is Never-ending.
(TD)
Finally, subjects also tend to prophesize future surveillance situations to which they
and others will be subjected. Particularly, this section focuses on the temporal aspects of
surveillance consciousness. In other words, one could suggest that subjects “Orwellianize” themselves and, instead of believing surveillance has met its climax and will remain
stagnant, offer a predictive sentiment as to how surveillance will continue to advance. This
theme was discerned to be encompassed by the notion of being situated before surveillance
or “distinctive, yet authoritative and predictable” (Ewick & Silbey, 1998: 47, emphasis
added). In addition, the law is described here by subjects who “depict legality as timeless
and transcendent […] understand[ing] that law changes and develops” (1998: 95). To
begin, some subjects show that the current surveillance society to which they are subjected
was clearly inevitable and could have easily been predicted in advance: “I totally didn’t
see this coming. Nope, not at all” (RD7).
Some excerpts had an apocalyptic undertone to them and referred to the end of
times as witnessing and being subjected to mobile technology surveillance. It is important
to note that such references are encompassed by subjects being before surveillance given
the idea of surveillance being temporally transcendent to human existence as noted above.
The following comments emphasize this apocalyptic message:
The bad days are going to come more often for all of us, the way things continue to
go. (GD7)
Fifty years from now we will be fractured beyond repair. (GS2)
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You know the end is coming soon when these blatantly wholesale surveillance
techniques are used and no attempt is made to explain or justify it. "Yeah the
American people won't do [expletive]". (RS8)
However, contrary to approaching what has been called “the end,” many subjects – like
those discussed above in a previous section of this thesis – claim to foresee a resistant
population to mobile technology surveillance:
Drones for spying, drones for bombing. They say they will be used for good things,
but how many times have we seen technology turned against us? I have no doubt
that people will begin taking action and start jamming them and shooting these
things out of the sky if given the opportunity. Always the prying eyes of industry and
government on the people, trying to control. People are fed up with this intrusive
behavior. (CD1)
Apparently, the old Mafia goodfellas made it a point never to discuss their business
over the telephone, on the assumption that the line could well be tapped. Now that
the criminals in Vancouver know the technology is being used by the police, the
smart ones will start using code words that can't be used for an indictment. (GS6)
These subjects exhibit their belief in the inevitability of resisters of surveillance, including
those who are criminals, ultimately differing from those who expressed apocalyptic
understandings. One subject refers to the futuristic idea of mobile technology surveillance
to one day become normalized to the extent of the devices being available to the population
more broadly: “I'm assuming their use isn’t illegal... just questionable […] I'm sure there
will be some retail version of the device in the near future. Once those in power start getting
tracked I'm sure legislation will soon follow” (GS7).
Furthermore, subjects also spoke of surveillance becoming even greater and more
surreptitious, echoing the changes foreseen in the law – but here with surveillance – as
shown by Ewick and Silbey’s analysis. Though being before surveillance acknowledges
the grandeur of surveillance, the power of the surveillance system is shown as something
that exists and is solidified. This narrative observes subjects’ understanding of surveillance
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to be continually advancing beyond its current state. For example, the idea of drones
following each person was communicated by one subject, further echoing changes in
technology: “Wait till the drone is the size of a housefly and there's one following every
citizen in the country 24/7” (RD5). Another subject responded to this possibility and
proposed that “[d]rones can be built to the size of an insect. They could potentially enter
your residence without you knowing via an open window or door. You'd hear a helicopter
hovering outside your third story apartment, but not a drone that could fit on your finger”
(RD5), presenting a potential of drones to enter residences without subjects’ knowledge. It
is at this point where subjects are helpless and suggest there is no future threat to
surveillance given that “there is no stopping the program[s]” (RD3). Indeed, such a
sentiment also overlaps with the state of exception reference noted above.
Interestingly, some subjects proceeded to predict even the type of mobile
technology surveillance and innovative technology that would be available in the future.
Consider the following examples:
So then we're only 20-40 years from the little floating face scanners from Half Life
2 then? (RD1)
Nope, that's what these things are, just bigger. This thread is full of people throwing
away liberty because they imagine it that makes them more secure. Next security
innovation will probably be a device that stops reproduction. (RD1)
These excerpts imply that there is something more to the current surveillance situation than
the technologies currently being used. Interestingly, the second excerpt can be seen to be
up against surveillance, as the subject denotes others easily giving away their liberty as
well as a technology that could completely control reproduction, leaving populations
powerless.
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In short, the excerpts above display subjects foreseeing the future of the
surveillance society. Here, subjects express through their sentiments with the notion of
being both before and briefly up against surveillance. The former is shown through the
idea that the surveillance society is predictable and is temporally transcendent to human
existence. Such sentiments echo Ewick and Silbey’s narrative where the sphere of law is
also said to be predictable. The latter is subtly exhibited through the later comments in the
section where the future of the surveillance society appears to be one of complete control
and oppression, facilitating the removal of liberty.
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VI. CONCLUSION
This thesis addressed one main research question: how is surveillance (or dataveillance)
from mobile technologies understood by those who are surveilled? Beyond this, four subquestions were approached: (1) How and to what extent do Ewick and Silbey’s three
narratives encapsulate subjective understandings of mobile technology surveillance? (2)
Does surveillance consciousness regarding mobile technologies vary according to the type
of media through which it is articulated? (3) Does surveillance consciousness regarding
mobile technologies vary by type of mobile technology surveillance? And (4) how do
people respond to the privacy and/or legal implications of mobile technology surveillance?
What we discover upon exploring surveillance consciousness is a complex set of subjective
understandings regarding contemporary mobile technology surveillance. This complexity,
as shown above, allows us to see gaps in previous conceptual models of surveillance.
However, the complexity of surveillance consciousness and its various directions it takes
is ultimately encapsulated by Ewick and Silbey’s three schemas. As I have shown
throughout this study, the common themes constituting surveillance consciousness
conform with one, two, or all three narratives, showing the adaptability of a key socio-legal
concept to surveillance studies.
I addressed at the outset two conceptual models that have commonly been used to
theorize the current surveillance society. To reiterate, the first model was Foucault’s
panopticon which induces a sense of self-awareness and forces prisoners – subjects in this
case – to modify their behaviour accordingly. The second model was Haggerty and
Ericson’s surveillant assemblage, where a multiplicity of rhizomes is interconnected to
form everyone’s data double. These never-ending rhizomes characterize the complexity of
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the current surveillance society that seamlessly captures subjects’ data doubles. After
exploring surveillance consciousness of mobile technology surveillance, various
discourses were found including, but not limited to, subjects relating surveillance to
terrorism or permitting certain types of surveillance provided some conditions are met. In
addition, other dominant discourses involved the temporal aspect involved in the
understanding of surveillance as well as adherence to the Agambian view of the state of
exception. Most notably, the above-mentioned themes, in some way, were associated with
or completely encapsulated by the schemas at the crux of this thesis: being situated with,
before, and/or against surveillance.
What surveillance consciousness represents is an analytical tool that can be used to
engage with the conceptual models of surveillance. Upon exploring surveillance
discourses, the panopticon is, as others have noted, limited in its appreciation for the current
surveillance society. In other words, subjects for the current study would not commit
robotically with complete docility to the panoptic gaze, but instead some subjects would
resist or engage with surveillance to use such monitoring to meet their own personal needs
or goals. Further, even the anger towards their own powerlessness displays subjects who
in many cases are not docile. The panoptic model does not account for such understandings
of surveillance.
Such understandings exhibited by subjects would also affect the operation of
surveillant assemblages. In many instances, subjects using fully encrypted software, or
suggesting to others that the app “Signal” should be used as shown in the comments above,
would essentially tear one portion of an assemblage to pieces until the rhizome can
continue building itself. In every subject’s data double will thus reside a gap – varying in
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size – in information gathered. This suggests that many assemblages are weakened by
subjects who could conform with surveillance, use it to satisfy their own ends, and/or resist
what is said to be its oppression. Inevitably, it is difficult for a data double to be “complete”
with the varying types of surveillance consciousness located in this study.
The panopticon and/or surveillant assemblage alone may account for those who
surveil and some further social implications, but for one to delve into the experiences of
subjects with only one model to try and establish comprehensive insight into subjective
understandings of surveillance is difficult. This exploration of surveillance consciousness
has provided a basis that can be used for future research around subjective understandings
of surveillance. Such research could involve using surveillance consciousness to gain
knowledge of subjective understandings in various institutions and spheres of social life;
these include, but are not limited to, workplaces, educational settings, and correctional
institutions. Further research could also more broadly study surveillance consciousness,
using this framework beyond mobile technologies by speaking to subjects in social
institutions about their experiences. This could encompass (surveillance) technologies such
as police bodycams (see Bud, 2016), biometrics (see Lyon, 2008), police dogs in airports
(see Braverman, 2013) and beyond.
Like all research this thesis was not without its limitations. First, the choice of
sources for this thesis was limited given that so many online newspapers have removed
their comment below the line sections. A more comprehensive study would have used
additional online newspapers. Second, using comments for data restricts the scope of the
research to online communities and thus avoids those who do not use any type of social
networking website or online newspaper. Further research should seek to include these
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subjects to achieve a more holistic understanding of a given population. Third, particular
subjectivities of commenters could not be accounted for when retrieving the data. That is,
nearly all subjects had unique usernames when posting comments, and their profiles could
not be accessed to provide a brief overview of their gender, ethnicity, etc. Speaking directly
to subjects could overcome this limitation. Future research could also focus more on
subjectivities, whether there exists variation among races/ethnicities, genders, and other
dimensions, and whether these factors play a role in determining episodes of one’s
surveillance consciousness. Though there are benefits to observing surveillance
consciousness without speaking to subjects, interviewing them would also give researchers
the ability to ask questions about how subjects understand and experience surveillance,
perhaps facilitating even more nuanced responses that directly pertain to the research
questions.
The aim of this thesis was to explore how surveillance from mobile technologies is
understood by subjects. Drawing on previous surveillance literature and work on legal
narratives, this thesis investigated surveillance consciousness. In studying subjective
understandings of surveillance, particularly regarding mobile technologies, this thesis has
provided groundwork to better grasp how subjects respond to growing surveillance and
what this means for the state, technologies and privacy in society. This exploration of
surveillance consciousness has demonstrated too the concerns some subjects have about
surveillance in addition to other subjects’ satisfaction with the current surveillance society.
The dominant discourses regarding the temporal aspect of surveillance consciousness and
an adherence to an Agambian view of the state of exception – in addition to the abovementioned themes – were ultimately encapsulated by Ewick and Silbey’s schemas. As
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such, this thesis showed a significant consistency between how subjects in Ewick and
Silbey’s research understand law and how subjects understand and experience mobile
technology surveillance. One broader implication of this is to suggest how two subdisciplines, surveillance and socio-legal studies, benefit from greater dialogue and crossfertilization.
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APPENDIX A: Tables of Procedures
Table 1: Comments Below the Line
Sources

Step #
1
2
3

The
Guardian
&
CBC

4
5

6

Collection Method
Key words used to find list of articles
(e.g. stingray surveillance)
Ensure collection includes articles only
post-Snowden
Select every article (every second for
Guardian) to assess (if there are more
than 30 comments, then every other
comment; if not, every comment)->
Articles selected must have either the
given technology’s name or
“surveillance” in the title of the article
Upon complete assessment, every
second comment is collected
Up to five (5) “thread” comments can
be used
Continue on to other comments past the
given “thread

Extra Notes

Search by
“relevance” to
keyword(s)
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Table 2: Social Media Forums
Social
Media
Forum

Step #

Step Description

Advanced Search
Words*

1

Search key words, not hashtags (e.g. drone
surveillance)
Ensure collection includes tweets only
post-Snowden
Select every fifth tweet
Assess tweet for pertinence to both
surveillance & the technology
Up to 5 “thread” tweets can be used (must
click tweet to check for threads)
Search key words (e.g. stingray
surveillance)
Ensure collection includes posts only postSnowden
Ensure title pertains to surveillance
Select every second post
Up to 5 comments in one thread
Max 20 per post

“Any of These
Words”

2
Twitter

3
4
5
1

Reddit

2
3
4
5
6

Including “emojis”
Consider nature of
what is attached to
the tweet (e.g. tweets
reacting to an
attached news article
referring to breach of
privacy rights)

*Advanced search words were the same for both Twitter and Reddit
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APPENDIX B: Variation in Schemas
FIGURE A

Node References - Online Newspapers

28

31

18
23

Against

Before

With

Other
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FIGURE B

Node References - Social Media

25
33

25

Against

17

Before

With

Other
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FIGURE C

Node References - Stingrays

19

25

33

Before

23

With

Against

Other
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FIGURE D

Node References - Drones

18
29

28
23

Before

With

Against

Other
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APPENDIX C: List of News Articles and Media Posts
CBC DRONES
(CD1) Title: U.S. approval of commercial UAVs outpacing Canadian rules
Author: Matt Kwong
(CD2) Title: Drones get more popular, and the rules are getting stricter
Author: Sheena Goodyear
(CD3) Title: Liberals drone shopping exercise sets stage for debate over lethal force
Author: Murray Brewster
(CD4) Title: Nova Scotians cash in on illegal drone use
Author: David Burke
CBC STINGRAYS
(CS1) Title: StingRay cellphone surveillance systems used by Vancouver police?
Author: N/A
(CS2) Title: Vancouver police admit to using StingRay cellphone surveillance, BCCLA
says
Author: Yvette Brend
(CS3) Title: RCMP reveals use of secretive cellphone surveillance technology for the
first time
Authors: Dave Seglins, Matthew Braga, Catherine Cullen
(CS4) Title: Someone is spying on cellphones in the nation’s capital
Date: April 3, 2017
Authors: Catherine Cullen, Brigitte Bureau
(CS5) Title: Cellphone monitoring device use should be transparent and limited,
researchers say
Author: Laura Wright
(CS6) Title: Stingray surveillance device questions prompt federal privacy complaint
Author: N/A
GUARDIAN DRONES
(GD1) Title: FBI admits to using surveillance drones over US soil
Author: Dan Roberts
(GD2) Title: FBI operating fleet of surveillance aircraft flying over US cities

98
Author: Associated Press in Washington
(GD3) Title: Worried about spying? Maybe you need a personal drone detection system
Author: Samuel Gibbs
(GD4) Title: US states await key drones decision – and the billions that could follow
Author: Ed Pilkington (Oklahoma)
(GD5) Title: Baltimore police confirms aerial surveillance of city residents
Authors: Baynard Woods, Ciara McCarthy
(GD6) Title: Inside Obama’s drone panopticon: a secret machine with no accountability
Author: Spencer Ackerman
(GD7) Title: I worked on the US drone program. The public should know what really
goes on
Author: Heather Linebaugh
(GD8) Title: Rise of the drones: from policing the streets to painting your house
Author: Mark Harris
GUARDIAN STINGRAYS
(GS1) Title: 2,000 cases may be overturned because police used secret Stingray
surveillance
Author: Nicky Woolf
(GS2) Title: IRS possessed Stingray cellphone surveillance gear, documents reveal
Author: Nicky Woolf, William Green
(GS3) Title: Lawmakers demand details on federal use of Stingray phone surveillance
Author: Nicky Woolf
(GS4) Title: Stingray spying: FBI’s secret deal with police hides phone dragnet from
courts
Author: Jessica Glenza, Nicky Woolf
(GS5) Title: No stingray in Silicon Valley: country kills plan to buy surveillance device
Author: Jessica Glenza
(GS6) Title: Vancouver police confirm use of ‘stingray’ surveillance technology
Author: Ashifa Kassam
(GS7) Title: Congressman introduces bill to end warrantless Stingray surveillance
Author: Nicky Woolf
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(GS8) Title: US Marshals spent over $10m on equipment for warrantless Stingray
surveillance
Author: Nicky Woolf
REDDIT DRONES
(RD1) Title: NYC Mayor Bloomberg says surveillance drones are inevitable in NYC:
‘get used to it’
(RD2) Title: California governor Jerry Brown vetoes bill limiting law enforcement use of
drone surveillance
(RD3) Title: Rand Paul proposes bill to prevent warrantless drone surveillance
(RD4) Title: Drone use in U.S. could lead to ‘warrantless mass surveillance’: ACLU
(RD5) Title: Drone surveillance may be unconstitutional
(RD6) Title: U.N. watchdog urges Obama to curb drone use, surveillance
(RD7) Title: U.S. drone surveillance expanding beyond declared combat zones
(RD8) Title: Texas bans drone surveillance: Legislation pending in 31 other states
REDDIT STINGRAYS
(RS1) Title: 2,000 cases may be overturned because police used secret Stingray
surveillance
(RS2) Title: Illinois Senate Committee passes bill to prohibit warrantless stingray spying;
Hinder federal surveillance program
(RS3) Title: Vancouver police admit to having used mass-surveillance device StingRay
(RS4) Title: Vancouver police confirm use of ‘stingray’ surveillance technology
(RS5) Title: 2,000 cases may be overturned because police used secret Stingray
surveillance: A motion filed Friday says the State Attorney’s office colluded with police
to withhold ‘discovery’ material obtained via Stingrays from defendants
(RS6) Title: The Dragnet: How a man accused of a million dollar fraud uncovered a
never before seen, secret surveillance device, Stingray
(RS7) Title: Edmonton police admit to owning stingray surveillance device
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(RS8) Title: What is the big secret surrounding Stingray Surveillance? State and local
law enforcement agencies across the U.S. are setting up fake cell towers to gather mobile
data, but few will admit it
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